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In September 1993 Damian Monroe Williams and Henry Keith
Watson stood trial in Los Angeles County Superior Court on twelve
charges of aggravated mayhem, felony assault, robbery, and attempted
murder arising out of the April 29, 1992 beating of Reginald Denny and
seven others during the South Central Los Angeles riots.' Legal teams
representing Williams and Watson 2 pleaded two defenses to the charges:
mistaken identity, and diminished capacity under a "group contagion"
theory of mob violence.3 According to a defense witness called to provide
expert testimony on mob violence, group contagion theory applies to a
"crowd situation" of "impulsive thoughtless action" marked by an emo-
tional "outpour" of frustration, anger, and violence in a given
community.
4
Pointing in her opening statement to the violent aftermath of the
Rodney King verdict, Karen Ackerson, lead counsel for Watson, described
South Central Los Angeles as a situation of "total and complete anarchy,
an abrupt explosion of anger, utter chaos, conflict, disorder, confusion
and explosion of tempers, mass hysteria, people scrambling, a spontane-
ous form of activity, sudden violence, screaming, turmoil, cursing, yell-
ing"; in sum, "a totally uncontrolled situation" where "everyone was doing
his own thing."5 Ackerson argued that "any human being who suddenly
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. A.B., Brown
University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1984.
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1. The seven other victims includedJorge Gonzalez, Takao Hirata, Fidel Lopez, Alicia
Maldonado, Terrence Manning, Fred Mathis, and Larry Tarvan. See Record at 3210,
People v. Williams (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (No. BA058116) [hereinafter Record]. Record
citations preserve the original text of the trial and hearing transcripts except where clearly
erroneous or ungrammatical.
2. The legal teams consisted of Edrissa (Edi) M.O. Faal and Wilma R. Shanks for
Williams, and Earl Broady and Karen Ackerson for Watson. See id.
3. See id. at 7820 (mistaken identity); id. at 8628-29 (diminished capacity).
4. See id. at 7113-14 (testimony of Dr. Armando Torres Morales).
5. Id. at 3296-97.
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found himself feeling violated, humiliated, confused, in despair and to-
tally hopeless in the same chaotic situation and circumstance may have
found himself caught up in the civil unrest of April 29th, 1992."6
Edi Faal, lead counsel for Williams, echoed Ackerson's description in
his opening statement. 'Yes there was a riot," he acknowledged, "some
people call it a rebellion. Some people call it an uprising."7 In fact,
"[w]hat happened," he clarified, "was nothing more than a mob scene."8
The people of South Central Los Angeles were "angry" and "frustrated,"
Faal explained, "by what they perceived to be the injustice of the verdict
in the Rodney King case and because of that, tempers flared."9 Now, he
declared, Williams and Watson "are being tried as scapegoats." 10
By design, the group contagion defense of diminished capacity viti-
ated the specific criminal intent required to prove aggravated mayhem
and attempted murder, the most serious charges facing Williams and
Watson." Indeed, Faal asserted that the "chaotic, sporadic, and disor-
derly" conditions in South Central Los Angeles "precluded" Williams and
Watson from "developing" the specific intent to commit such crimes. 12
The "chaos, sudden conflict and total disorder" in the South Central
community, Ackerson added, demonstrated "no preexisting reflection,"
only the "sudden heat of passion."' 3
In this Essay, I explore the form and substance of the Williams and
Watson legal teams' diminished capacity defense. 14 Strictly construed,
the defense neither exculpates nor excuses Williams and Watson's law-
breaking acts. Rather, the defense explains such acts in the racial context
6. Id. at 3297.




11. The charges of attempted murder and aggravated mayhem arise under the
California Penal Code. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 189, 205, 664 (West 1988). To
establish attempted murder, California requires a showing that a person unlawfully
attempted a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing with malice aforethought. Cal.
Penal Code §§ 187, 189, 664. To prove aggravated mayhem, California requires evidence
that a person "unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
physical or psychological well-being of another person, intentionally causes permanent
disability or disfigurement of another human being or deprives a human being of a limb,
organ, or member of his or her body." Cal. Penal Code § 205.
The Williams-Watson jury acquitted the defendants of both charges.
12. See Record, supra note 1, at 6617.
13. Id. at 3299.
14, For helpful background on the diminished capacity defense, see generally Peter
Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal
and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1511 (1992); Peter Arenella, The Diminished
Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage,
77 Colum. L. Rev. 827 (1977); Joshua Dressler, Reaffirming the Moral Legitimacy of the
Doctrine of Diminished Capacity- A Brief Reply to Professor Morse, 75 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 958 (1984); Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished
Capacity, 75J. Crim. L & Criminology 1 (1984).
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of their commission, thereby mitigating claims of retributive punish-
ment. 15 Taking this explanation as a starting point, the Essay begins a
larger project studying the historical intersection of race, lawyers, and
ethics in the context of the American criminal justice system, specifically
in cases of racial violence.1 6 Given the breadth of law and jurisprudence
on the subject of. racial violence, 17 I confine the scope of the project to
cases involving private acts of criminal violence motivated by racial differ-
ence, such as black-on-white or white-on-black violence. My purpose is to
investigate the rhetoric of race or "race-talk" in criminal defense advocacy
and ethics dealing with racially motivated private violence. By race-talk, I
mean both the colorblind and the color-coded narratives heard in court-
rooms and law offices. Out of these settings emerge racialized stories,
that is, stories that appear facially neutral but inflict invidious injury.' 8
In prior works, I define story as the constructed core of the lawyering
process.' 9 Story comprises multiple narratives of diverse origins, signal-
15. Faal conceded that the "perceived injustice" of the Rodney King verdict is neither
a "defense" nor an "excuse," but rather "an explanation for the beating of Reginald
Denny." Record, supra note 1, at 8628-29. For a general survey of criminal law defenses,
see Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
199 (1982).
16. The project accords with a revival in the study of race in American law. See
generally Derrick A. Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism
(1992); Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (Richard Delgado ed., 1995)
(forthcoming); Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering- One Chicano's Vision of
Progressive Law Practice (1992); Race-ingJustice, En-gendering Power:. Essays on Anita
Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality (Toni Morrison, ed., 1992)
[hereinafter Race-ingJustice, En-Gendering Power]; PatriciaJ. Williams, The Alchemy of
Race and Rights (1991); Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and
the First Amendment (MariJ. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
17. See, e.g., Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising (Robert Gooding-
Williams ed., 1993); Colloquy: Racism in the Wake of the Los Angeles Riots, 70 Deny. U. L.
Rev. 187, 187-311 (1993); Reginald L. Robinson, "The Other Against Itself":
Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 15, 22 (1993) (ascribing "violent discourse" between African and Korean Americans to
"structural inequities, such as racial injustice and economic inequality").
18. For an example of a racialized criminal defense story, see George P. Fletcher, A
Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial 106-15, 127-34, 205-09
(1988). Fletcher explains:
Reading the record of the Goetz case, one hardly finds an explicit reference to
the race of anyone. But indirectly and covertly, the defense played on the racial
factor. Slotnick's strategy of relentlessly attacking the "gang of four," "the
predators" on society, calling them "vultures" and "savages," carried undeniable
racial undertones. These verbal attacks signaled a perception of the four youths
as representing something more than four individuals committing an act of
aggression against a defendant. That "something more" requires extrapolation
from their characteristics to the class of individuals for which they stand. There is
no doubt that one of the characteristics that figures in this implicit extrapolation
is their blackness.
Id. at 206.
19. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings L.J. 769,
771 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
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ing a wide range of social meanings, values, and images. The narratives
embody the complexity and the tensions that accompany such divergent
meanings. Legal storytelling enmeshes narrative tension or dissonance in
the conventions of advocacy-in this case the conventions of a state crim-
inal trial defense strategy.
This Essay argues that the rhetorical structure of criminal defense
stories of black-on-white racial violence, manifested here in the group
contagion claim of diminished capacity, reflects the dissonance of com-
peting narratives of deviance and defiance. 20 The deviance narrative
constructs racial identity in terms of bestiality or pathology.2' This con-
struction portrays young black males as deviant objects controlled by bes-
tial instincts or pathological impulses. The defiance narrative, in compar-
ison, constructs racial identity in the language of rage and rebellion. This
account depicts young black males as rational, voluntary subjects guided
by the imperatives of resistance and solidarity in opposition to racial sub-
ordination. Applied to the April 1992 events in South Central Los
Angeles, the account relays the image of an insurrection, rather than a
riot. Explicating this distinction, Kimberl6 Crenshaw and Gary Peller
contend that the image of a riot suggests an emotional, individual reac-
tion to the Rodney King jury verdict, while the image of an insurrection
conveys a more rational, community-wide response to "a systematic set of
social dynamics" involving the "day-to-day subordination of the Los
Angeles African American community."
22
Client Narrative, 100 Yale LJ. 2107, 2118 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Law
Practice].
20. The narratives of deviance and defiance pervade African-American literature,
inventing fractured characters like Richard Wright's Bigger Thomas. See Richard Wright,
Native Son (1940); see also RobertJames Butler, The Function of Violence in Native Son, in
Bigger Thomas 103-16 (Harold Bloom ed., 1990); John M. Reilly, Giving Bigger a Voice:
The Politics of Narrative in Native Son, in New Essays on Native Son 35-62 (Keneth
Kinnamon ed., 1990); Valerie Smith, Alienation and Creativity in Native Son, in Bigger
Thomas 143-50 (Harold Bloom ed., 1990); Craig Werner, Bigger's Blues: Native Son and
the Articulation of Afro-American Modernism, in New Essays on Native Son 117-52
(Keneth Kinnamon ed., 1990). See generally Henry L Gates,Jr., Figures in Black: Words,
Signs, and the "Racial" Self (1987); Henry L. Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory
of Afro-American Literary Criticism (1988).
21. For a trenchant discussion of the deviant construction of black criminality, see
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears-on the Social
Construction of Threat, 80 Va. L. Rev. 503 (1994).
Deviant social construction also emerges in death penalty and juvenile defense
strategies. See Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27
Law & Soc'y Rev. 19 (1993); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility,
and AngryYoung Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change (forthcoming 1995); Sara Cobb, Stabilizing Violence: Structural
Complexity and Moral Transparency in Penalty Phase Narratives (July 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review); Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing
Older: On Kids and Crime (Feb. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
22. Kimberl6 Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 Denv. L. Rev. 283,
294 (1993); see also Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law
[Vol. 95:13011304
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In the Williams-Watson case, narratives of racial deviance and defi-
ance proliferate in a kind of parallel tension.23 The notion of prolifera-
tion implies competition, not contradiction.24 At trial, the narratives con-
tend for a position of privilege.2 5 Neither reason nor truth confers the
privilege of narrative dominance. Only power-circulating through the
thickness of laws, institutional practices, and legal relations26 -bestows
privilege, and then only partially.2 7 Power functions by constraining the
space open to rival narratives in legal storytelling. Narrative privilege is
thus contingent on the contest of power over story. The winner of that
contest controls, at least in an ephemeral sense, the signification of mean-
ings and values in the juridical world of courts, public institutions, and
street-level legal agents.
The context of criminal defense advocacy and ethics limits the space
available for narrative contest. Within the narrow constraints of the crim-
inal justice system, defense lawyers find scarce opportunity to contest the
dominant narratives embedded in laws, institutional practices, and legal
relations, even when those narratives inscribe negative racial stereotypes,
such as the image of the black male as a social deviant. The risks of state
violence are too high and the burdens of advocacy too great to press for
such opportunities, particularly when the image to be contested seems
bounded and short-lived. For criminal defense lawyers, the image of
black male deviance takes passing shape in a private domain of attorney-
client negotiation, adversarial bargaining, and institutional adjudication.
The geography of this domain is legal, not social; moreover, the temporal
quality of its imagery is transitory, not fixed. Accordingly, lawyers believe
Reform for African-Americans?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1216-17 (1994) (citing "recurring
riots and uprisings in subordinated communities"); Manning Maable, US commentary: At
the End of the Rainbow, 34 Race & Class 75, 75 (1992) (referring to the Los Angeles
"racial uprising"); Robinson, supra note 17, at 24-25 (describing anger as "an authentic
voice and a vehicle for rooting out racism, racial injustice, and economic inequality").
23. On the proliferation of discourses in law, see generally Michel Foucault, The
History of Sexuality: An Introduction 18 (1978) (describing the "multiplication of
discourses concerning sex in the field of exercise of power").
24. See Alan Hunt, Foucault's Expulsion of Law: Toward a Retrieval, 17 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 1, 32 (1992) (arguing that "every social field is traversed by a series of
incommensurate but not necessarily contradictory discourses").
25. See Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 22, at 286 ("Law in general and the courtroom
in particular are arenas where narratives are contested and the power of interpretation
exercised.").
26. For Michel Foucault, the "language of power is law," embodied in "a more-or-less
organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations" and "machinery" of practices.
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977,
at 201, 198, 156 (Colin Gordon, ed., 1980). Power, on this view, "is 'always already there.'"
Id. at 141; see also Patricia Ewick, Postmodern Melancholia, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 755, 758
(1992) (describing "technical, faceless, and individuated" character of "contemporary
(postmodern/disciplinary) power").
27. See Hunt, supra note 24, at 32 (claiming that "[n]o single discourse generally




there is no permanent spillover of racial identity or imagery from the
private domain of law to the public domain of society. The apparent ab-
sence of spillover frees criminal lawyers to use narratives of racial devi-
ance in telling private defense stories without consideration of the poten-
tial public injury to group or community racial identity.
This -Essay challenges criminal defense lawyers' freedom in story-
telling. The Essay is divided into three parts. Part I examines the
Williams-Watson legal defense teams' use of racialized narratives to tell
the individual stories of Damian Williams and Henry Watson. Part II ana-
lyzes the propriety of the defense teams' deployment of racialized narra-
tives under conventional and alternative ethical regimes. Part III pro-
poses an ethic of race-conscious responsibility accomplished through
middle-level rules of criminal defense practice. The Essay concludes that
criminal defense lawyers representing black males in cases of racially-mo-
tivated private violence bear a race-conscious responsibility to forego nar-
ratives or stories that construct racial identity in terms of individual,
group, or community deviance.
I. RACLALiZED STORY
The ethic of race-conscious responsibility in criminal defense advo-
cacy that I develop in this Essay derives from the principle of interpretive
responsibility in storytelling.28 In both advocacy and counseling, lawyers
construct stories. 29 Although laws, legal institutions, and other legal
agents frame that construction, lawyers play a central role. Accounts of
this role and its attendant obligations differ. Dominant accounts
28. For recent debate on interpretive responsibility in storytelling, see, e.g., Jane B.
Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 255 (1994); Richard Delgado, On Telling
Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 665 (1993); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1994); Marc A. Fajer, Authority,
Credibility, and Pre-Understanding. A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal
Scholarship, 82 Geo. L.J. 1845 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories
Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807 (1993); Daniel A. Farber
& Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on
Scholarship and Truth, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 647 (1994).
29. On the imperfection of lawyer construction of client story, see, e.g., Naomi R.
Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 Geo. LJ. 2475, 2490-91 (1993); Clark D. Cunningham, The
Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal
Discourse, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1298 (1992); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power:
The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 773-88 (1995); Binny Miller,




propound client,3 0 court,3 1 and law-centered obligations.3 2 Discretion-
ary approaches proffer justice,3 3 public,3
4 and third party-centered 3 5
obligations.
The proposed ethic of race-conscious responsibility presents an alter-
native community-centered obligation. The inclusion of a community di-
mension stems from the premise that legal storytelling constructs both
public and private identity.3 6 Dominant accounts of criminal defense
ethics deny this public/private overlap. That denial rests on the distinc-
tion between a client's legal and social identity. According to this distinc-
tion, legal identity issues from the institutions of the juridical state
charged with the adjudication and enforcement of law. Lawyers help to
frame a client's legal identity in court pleadings and motions, at trial, and
on appeal. Social identity evolves from the institutions of the political
state, the family, and the market. Lawyers make little contribution to the
shape of a client's social identity. It follows, therefore, that law and legal-
ity stand separate from politics and society.
The separation of law, politics, and society in dominant accounts of
criminal defense ethics does not fully correspond to the public/private
dichotomy in modem liberal theory. Although liberal theory adheres to
the separation of law and politics, it defines the public realm in terms of
state action, both juridical and political, and the private realm primarily
in terms of the, family and the market. Dominant ethical accounts, in
contrast, shift juridical forms of state action from the public to the private
sphere. This shift reconceives the private sphere as the site of legal iden-
30. See, e.g., David A. Binder et al., Lawyers As Counselors: A Client-Centered
Approach 19-23 (1991); see also CharlesJ. Ogletree,Jr., The People vs. Anita Hill: A Case
for Client-Centered Advocacy (Jan. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review). But see Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rev.
717, 776-78 (1987); MichelleJacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in
Client Centered Counseling (Mar. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
31. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1031 (1975); Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev.
39 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer. Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession (1998).
33. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1083 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1
(1988).
35. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client
Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. Rev.
213 (1990).
36. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence
ofIdentity, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1213, 1233 (1994) ("By writing or revising the scripts of social
roles, the law participates in the constitution of selves and in the construction of
collectivities."); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: TheJurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 Cal.
L. Rev. 741, 764 (1994) ("Storytelling serves to create and confirm identity, both individual
and collective.") (footnote omitted).
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tity. At the same time, the accounts combine the remainder of public
and private spheres-the institutions of the political state, the family, and
the market-to establish the site of social identity. In this way, the ac-
counts invert the public/private dichotomy of liberal theory to conform
to a revised categorical division of law and society.
Inevitably, however, spillover occurs between the legal and social
spheres of identity.3 7 Indeed, once established, the legal identity of law-
breakers-whether deviant or defiant-spreads beyond law to society.
Spillover demonstrates the pernicious effect of racialized law stories.
Race-infected storytelling imports historical practices of subordination
38
into the legal identity-making process under the rubric of colorblind
treatment. These practices mediate the interpretation of laws and the
conduct of legal relations, acquiring the form of race-talk. The repetition
of race-talk pushes racially subordinate images outside the criminal court-
house into the mainstream of popular culture and society. Regina Austin
finds evidence of spillover in the "almost hysterical suspicion" that black
men encounter "as they negotiate public spaces in urban environments
and attempt to engage in simple commercial exchanges."3 9 Public/pri-
vate and social/legal dichotomies fail to cabin the images of black male
deviance that arouse such suspicion.
40
A. Race-Talk and Narrative Intersection
The Williams and Watson defense teams employed race-talk in an
effort to place race and justice in the context of the "real world. '41 Faal
declared: "[J]ustice does not exist in a vacuum. It's not a concept that
you... put... in isolation. Justice exists in the real world."42 People
acting in that world, he observed, "commit the most heinous crimes out
37. On "spillover" in sociolegal roles, see Dan-Cohen, supra note 36, at 1235-36.
38. On public and private sites of racial subordination, see Regina Austin, "A Nation
of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994
Utah L. Rev. 147, 147-56 (demonstrating negative labeling and treatment of blacks
engaged in buying and selling goods and services); Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1841, 1861 (1994) (showing
that "contemporary local government law perpetuates the historically imposed segregation
of the races").
39. Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1773 (1992) (footnotes omitted); see also Adeno
Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2253, 2265 (1993) (discussing the public image of
the "transgressing black").
40. For studies of young black male identity, see Eliah Anderson, Streetwise: Race,
Class, and Change in an Urban Community 163-206 (1990); Richard Majors &Janet M.
Billson, Cool Pose: The Dilemmas of Black Manhood in America (1992).
41. See Record, supra note 1, at 7931. Reginald Robinson asserts that in the African
American community, violence, like rage, only finds meaning in the context of collective
historical suffering and under a political regime of "white supremacy." See Robinson,
supra note 17, at 93.
42. Record, supra note 1, at 7931.
1308 [Vol. 95:1301
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of anger" and frustration over injustice.43 For Williams and Watson, in-
justice occurred "in connection with the [Rodney] King case.""! Coupled
with anger, Faal noted, "frustration brings about agitation and, of course,
agitation could bring about a situation where people gather together in a
mob situation and start acting out in a thoughtless and impulsive man-
ner."45 In this sense, defiance and deviance intersect in explosions of
racial violence.
The intersection of defiance and deviance narratives in race-talk
spawns double narratives46 of "good" and "bad" young black men.4 7 For
"bad"-predatory-black men like Damian Williams, deviance spurs
violence. On direct examination, Timothy McRath, a police officer and a
prosecution witness, testified that Williams confronted him prior to the
outbreak of violence in South Central Los Angeles, stating: "Fuck you.
You ain't shit. If you was any kind of nigger, you would be out here with
us.",48 For "good"-law-abiding-black men like Henry Watson, defiance
degenerates into deviant acts of violence. Ackerson, in her opening state-
ment, described Watson as a married, gainfully employed "ex marine"
with two children.4 9 Upon direct examination, Chester Clary, a former
colleague of Watson's and a defense witness, testified: '"ie is not-was
not the person who I had worked with. When I say not the same person
who I knew, I just couldn't, you know, this is a Keith who I knew? What
happened? I don't know."50 During her closing statement, while sum-
marizing Clary's testimony, Ackerson recounted that Watson "is not that
kind of person," that is, not a person capable of committing acts of crimi-
nal lawbreaking.51
Faal traced the violent intersection of defiance and deviance in
South Central Los Angeles to "sociological factors."52 Citing the expert
witness testimony of three sociologists on the nature of "crowd" and "mob
activity," he pointed to "situations where moods and behavior are rapidly
communicated in an impulsive and thoughtless manner" through fear,
panic, and frustration.53 An individual placed in such situations, he
43. Id. at 7916.
44. Id. at 7701.
45. Id. at 7913.
46. The defense teams' "doubling" of narratives signifying the "black experience" of
Williams and Watson creates a problem of textual indeterminacy common to African
American literature. See Henry L Gates,Jr., The Blackness of Blackness: A Critique of the
Sign and the Signifying Monkey, in Black Literature and Literary Theory 285, 305 (Henry
L. Gates, Jr. ed., 1984).
47. On the division of the social world into "good" citizens and "evil" predators, see
Kathleen Daly, Comment, Men's Violence, Victim Advocacy, and Feminist Redress, 28 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 777, 779 (1994).
48. Record, supra note 1, at 5124, 5131.
49. See id. at 3294-95.
50. Id. at 5236, 5250.
51. Id. at 7691.
52. See id. at 7922.
53. Id. at 7912.
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claimed, "loses his free will and just flows with the temper of the mob"
even when he ordinarily "do[esin't think like that or act like that."
54
To appreciate the frustration inciting Williams and Watson, Faal
urged the trial court to consider the thirty month jail sentences "handed
down" against police officers Koon and Powell in the Rodney King case.55
Their conduct, he argued, "precipitated the actions that led to the riots";
their brutality "brought about this whole mess."56 They induced "the
feeling of despair among people who feel that justice is not being done
especially when it comes to their kind," Faal insisted.57 They, he per-
sisted, fueled "the perceived injustice and the helplessness that people
felt in South Central Los Angeles."58 Because "violence grows out of spe-
cific social conditions," Faal reiterated, Williams and Watson "cannot be
seen and should not be seen in a vacuum."59 Race-talk of this sort en-
codes double images of black defiance and deviance into the discourse of
criminal advocacy.
B. Deviance Narratives
The presence of deviant racial imagery in criminal defense narratives
is not simply a function of overzealous advocacy; it is a basic, essentializ-
ing tendency of racialized storytelling. Because that tendency is natural-
ized by the content of legal discourse and the conduct of legal relations,
lawyers overlook the spillover effects of deviant imagery. Yet, as Regina
Austin points out, blacks experience these effects, often in moments of
public humiliation.60 The destructive spillover effects of race-talk are
bound up in the experience of public humiliation and indignity.
Lawyers' neglect of the destructive spillover effects of race-talk dis-
closes unreflective deliberative judgment. Criminal defense lawyers dis-
play unreflective judgment when they participate in rigid modes of for-
malist and instrumentalist deliberation.6 ' Formalist deliberation treats
racial deviance as a neutral and objective category of description. To a
formalist, young black males are deviant. Instrumentalist deliberation as-
54. Id. at 7925, 7921.
55. See id. at 8535. Faal's reference to the Rodney King case prompted an objection
from Deputy DistrictAttorneyjanet Moore. Moore stated: "All along we have said that this
case is not the Rodney King case. This is Damian Williams['s] case. And those two cases
cannot be compared particularly when it comes to the point of sentencing." Id. Faal
responded: "The prosecution keeps saying that this case has nothing to do with the
Rodney King case, yet during the trial the court kept repeatedly telling the jurors not to
relate this case to the Rodney King case, which suggests there is a relationship." Id. at
8536.
56. Id. at 8536-37.
57. Id. at 8629.
58. Id. at 8630.
59. Id. at 8630, 8537.
60. See Austin, supra note 39, at 1773 (mentioning that "lawless behavior by some
blacks stigmatizes all and impedes collective progress" of the black community).
61. For a discussion of formalist and instrumentalist styles of deliberation in poverty
law practice, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 Geo. L.J. 2567 (1993).
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serts racial deviance for strategic reasons: 62 to win an acquittal or to gain
a favorable plea bargain. To an instrumentalist, young black males are
made to appear deviant, whether or not they are in fact deviant.63 Law-
yers often engage in formalist and instrumentalist deliberation simultane-
ously. Consideration of the integrity of a person or community of color,
and the harm posed by race-talk, falls outside both modes of deliberation.
The Williams and Watson defense teams displayed formalist and in-
strumentalist deliberative tendencies in mustering evidentiary support for
their claim of diminished capacity. Relying on the expert opinion of Dr.
Armando Morales, a clinical social worker,64 they suggested that young
black males as a group, and the black community as a whole, share a
pathological tendency to commit acts of violence. 65 In laying the founda-
tion for the expert testimony of Dr. Morales, Faal stated that "there was
some type of a contagious behavior or contagion that was taking place" in
South Central Los Angeles. 66 People, he continued, were "seeing" and
"copying" other people "doing" violence "without thinking it out. '67 In a
"riotic situation," Faal elaborated, "things get so sporadic, so random, so
indiscriminate, so thoughtless that" people "do not reflect on their indi-
vidual action [s]."68 The "frenzy" of a riot thus "precludes" people from
individually "forming" the "specific intent to kill or to commit
mayhem." 69
62. On trial lawyers' instrumental use of racialized narratives in jury selection, see
Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race injury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 Md. L. Rev.
107, 147 (1994) (discussing trial lawyers' assumption that "race, as an indication of group
membership and social experience, affects how ajuror will interpret events and whether a
trial argument will seem persuasive or commonsensical").
63. Michael Coffino observes that "[s]trict fidelity to historical fact" in the legal
narratives of criminal trials "competes with the lawyer's need to ensure the right 'moral' to
his or her story-the conclusion favorable to the client." Michael A. Coffino, Genre,
Narrative andJudgment: Legal and Protest Song Stories in Two Criminal Cases, 1994 Wis.
L. Rev. 679, 687.
64. Prosecutors disputed the admissibility of expert opinion regarding group
contagion theory, challenging the scientific basis of the proffered testimony. See Record,
supra note 1, at 6665-66, 6738-39.
On evidence of bias in expert testimony, see David Faust, Use and Then Prove, or
Prove and Then Use? Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Mental Health Professionals'
Courtroom Involvement, 3 Ethics & Behav. 359,375 (1993) (remarking that "much of what
psychologists and psychiatrists present in court is supported by little more than personal
validation"); Michael. L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 625, 642-43 (1993) (pointing out that "variables such as
race, sex, culture, gender preference, physical attractiveness and economic status
significantly affect expert testimony").
65. Randall Kennedy contests the notion of a unitary "black community." See Randall
Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 Harv. L.
Rev. 1255, 1276 (1994) (noting "intra-racial complexities that stem from socio-economic,
ideological, and other sorts of differences within black communities").
66. Record, supra note 1, at 6667.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 6667-68.
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Morales subsequently testified that group contagion behavior,
though "highly unpredictable," is "triggered" by a "powerful feeling of
frustration."70 Frustration, he stated, "can come about simply by living in
a state of poverty, not being able to have employment .... feeling locked
out from full participation in society."7' Acting out "violent frustration,"
he attested, can result in "a lot of destruction" very often committed by
"young people, most often males."72 At "the height of the contagious
feeling," Morales closed, "especially in those situations where there is
frenzy or a lot of anger... one is governed by in large [sic] by a lot of
impulsive behavior, .a lot of impulsive action where there isn't much
thinking prior to acting .... "73
The defense teams' decision to adopt a deviance theory of dimin-
ished capacity illustrates the tendency in criminal defense advocacy to
pathologize racial difference. Deviance case theory alternately combines
claims of mental disorder7 4 or incompetence 75 with claims of cultural7 6
70. Id. at 7114.
71. Id. at 7113.
72. Id. at 7114, 7127.
73. Id. at 7114, 7144.
74. On disorder-related defenses, see StephenJ. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587, 1634-35 (1994) (observing that "the psychopath lacks empathy and
conscience, traits whose absence surely predispose an actor strongly to selfish, antisocial,
and perhaps criminal conduct"); Michael A. Tesner, Note, Racial Paranoia as a Defense to
Crimes of Violence: An Emerging Theory of Self-Defense or Insanity?, 11 B.C. Third
World Lj. 307 (1991) (urging recognition of racial paranoia-induced delusional disorder
as valid insanity defense).
75. For a broad exploration of the meaning of competence, see RichardJ. Bonnie,
The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusy and Drope, 47 U. Miami L. Rev.
539, 554 (1993) (distinguishing between foundational concept of "competence to assist
counsel" and contextualized concept of "decisional competence").
76. The defense of cultural deprivation commonly arises on behalf of immigrants,
reftigees, and indigenous people. See Alison D. Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural
Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 437, 439 (1993) (calling for
formal establishment and admission of cultural defense). When successful, Renteln
explains, the defense "permits] the reduction (and possible elimination) of a charge, with
a concomitant reduction in punishment." Id. The defense offers alternative cognitive and
volitional logics for this reduction: "either (i) the individual simply did not believe that his
or her actions contravened any laws (cognitive case), or (ii) the individual was compelled
to act the way he or she did (volitional case)." Id.
Both logics seemed to operate during the French excision trials of 1991 and 1993. See
Bronwyn Winter, Women, the Law, and Cultural Relativism in France: The Case of
Excision, 19 Signs 939, 948-51 (1994). At the trials, Winter reports, defense lawyers
asserted that" 'poor illiterate Africans don't know any better,' " and thus stood "incapable
of doing anything but unthinkingly following their [female excision] traditions." Id. at
948, 951. She adds that defense lawyers reinforced "the image of the 'ignorant Africans' "
through expert witness testimony concerning "the idea of a 'group superego' that controls
the actions of the members of the group." Id. at 949.
Winter admits "that it is difficult to determine how much of this role is actually being
played by the defendants concerned and how much of it is merely being attributed to them
by others." Id. But, she insists, "when the only role allocated in the first place is that of
'the ignorant African,' it is somewhat difficult to appear as anything different, since any
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or environmental 77 deprivation. Faal remarked, "What we have here is
impulsive action[s] of violence that are thoughtless, that must be con-
demned but do not go to the criminal state of mind or the depraved state
of mind...."-8 Like Williams, Faal pointed out, "[w]e are all the product
of our circumstances in our environment."79 Crudely distilled, the in-
stant claim of racial deviance gives rise to the argument that young black
male criminal defendants are often "nonculpably out of control."
80 This
dispositional excuse frustrates the intent and voluntary act requirements
of criminal liability.8 1 Faal explained:
[M]y point here is the lack of ability to even form specific intent
in such situations and Dr. Morales says that some of these par-
ticipants described it in the following way; they said it was a feel-
ing of unreal [sic], it was wild, it was crazy, it was strange. These
are the feelings of people that get caught up in this type of situa-
tion. To them everything is unreal, reality is no longer what
they are dealing with, it was wild, it was crazy.
And Dr. Morales said that these people participated in
these group activities through violence without any pre-thought
or plan, they come into it with no pre-thought, with no plan....
When you are caught up in those situations [, yl ou cannot have
the specific intent required.
8 2
Implicit in Faal's explanation of group lawbreaking violence lies a
notion of deviant character. Under legal excuse doctrine, character
other reality, any other persona, is denied." Id. Moreover, she speculates that defense
lawyers "encouraged the defendants to exhibit such behavior." Id.
77. On theories of environmental deprivation, see Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social
Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 Law & Ineq. J. 9 (1985); R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of
Criminal Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev.
459 (1994). But see Morse, supra note 74, at 1654 (contending that "a history of
deprivation itself does not furnish grounds for a control excuse, even when it is causally
relevant to the actor's offense").
78. Record, supra note 1, at 8652.
79. Id.
80. Cf. Morse, supra note 74, at 1600 (declaring that human beings "can be subject to
momentary and apparently capricious passions that leave them feeling subjectively unfree
and that seem to compromise their ability to control themselves").
81. Recognizing the likelihood of this result, Deputy District Attorney Moore argued:
[T]hese are not impulsive actions. These are callous actions, they're vicious
actions, they're actions that were thought out to the extent that Mr. Williams
knew what he was doing. We're not talking about a child here. This is a man
that's old enough to vote. He himself has fathered a child. He's had the
opportunity to have an education. He's functioned in his community. This is not
a baby that we're talking about here. This is an individual who can recognize the
consequences of his acts.... And all we are doing here is asking this court to
hold the defendant responsible for what he, as an.adult, as a thinking individual
chose to do.
Record, supra note 1, at 8660, 8662.
82. Id. at 7930-31.
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"rarely" furnishes the basis for a defense.83 instead, the standard control
excuse of "irresistible impulse" predominates.8 4 Applied here, however,
deviance theory suggests a deeper "nonculpable developmental cause"85
of criminal violence: racial character. The racialized assignment of devi-
ant pathology to the character of black lawbreakers in criminal defense
narratives depersonalizes individual responsibility for violent behavior
under a race-neutral pretext of universality. At oral argument, Faal high-
lighted the "mass hysteria" surrounding the Rodney King verdict, accen-
tuating the "impulsive" mob behavior of individuals operating free of the
"social controls" provided by "police officers."8 6 It was, he stressed, "more
emotional than thoughtful."87 Ascribing the mob attack to "anger, frus-
tration, injustice and other social reasons," Faal announced: 'You know
people get caught up in things."88
For criminal defense lawyers, the racial character of a defendant of-
fers the opportunity for formalist and instrumentalist attributions of a
nonculpable mental state.89 The practice of attribution follows from two
related sets of racially-derived cognitive assumptions.90 Under the first
set, lawyers infer that people of color lack the mind and moral character
to engage in willful, voluntary acts. Faal contended, for instance, that
"but for his ignorance[, Damian Williams] would not have attacked...
83. See Morse, supra note 74, at 1602; see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(a). Rule 404(a)
addresses the circumstantial use of character evidence to infer that a person acted
consistently with his character on a specific occasion. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) advisory
committee's note. Under the Rule, the "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except" when offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut
evidence relevant to the character of an accused, the victim, or a witness. See Fed. R. Evid.
404(a)(1)-(3). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for other
specified purposes." See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The advisory committee's note cautions that
the circumstantial use of character evidence raises issues regarding relevancy, prejudice,
and methods of proof. See Fed. K Evid. 404 advisory committee's note; see also
McCormick on Evidence 786-830 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
84. See Morse, supra note 74, at 1599.
85. Id. at 1653.
86. Record, supra note 1, at 7680.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 7690.
89. On the epistemological underpinnings of culpability attribution in criminal law,
see Rebecca Dresser, Culpability and Other Minds, 2 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary LJ. 41, 42, 87
(1993) (addressing mental state attribution as a cultural practice and contending that
"[c]ulpabillty attribution is embedded in and bounded by the cultural system in which it
occurs").
90. On the cognitive dimensions of race, see D. MarvinJones, Darkness Made Visible:
Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 Geo. LJ. 437, 441 & n.14 (1993) (approaching the
"figure of race" as a "cognitive concept" existing "prior to and distinct from the inferences
one makes about race and prior to social structures of race-based domination"); D. Marvin
Jones, No Time for Trumpets: Title VII, Equality, and the Fin de Si~cle, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
2311, 2367 (1994) [hereinafter Jones, No Time for Trumpets] (describing "race as a
window through which we look at the world").
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Reginald Denny."9 ' Ignorance, according to Faal, "is what brought
Damian Williams before the court. It is his ignorance that has led him to
the situation where he is in."92
Under a second set of cognitive assumptions, lawyers reason that
people of color suffer no harm, either individually or as members of
communities, when made to appear lacking in the properties of mind
and character necessary for moral agency. Faal's oral argument in the
Williams-Watson case provides an example of this reasoning. He stated:
This was the most unsophisticated crime. Here are people com-
mitting crimes with a helicopter up there, cameramen, there
were cameras, there are hundreds if not thousands of witnesses.
Any sophisticated criminal will be aware of the fact that the like-
lihood of being arrested was very high because of the presence
of the helicopter, the camera and other news people, yet indi-
viduals continued and engaged in the conduct oblivious to the
fact that their conduct or acts are being recorded. I think that
shows lack of sophistication.
Clearly, the crime on Mr. Denny, as regrettable as it is, it
was not a planned crime. It was not a thought out crime.93
The cognitive assumptions underlying Faal's implied attributions of
individual and group deviance tie racial character to criminal violence.
Defense lawyers may put forward various factors to link race and crime,
for example, drug abuse94 and poverty.9 5 To a lesser extent, educational
inequality96 and community segregation 97 likely contribute to this link.
What forges that link, however, is the strategic use of racial identifica-
91. Record, supra note 1, at 8671.
92. Id. at 8650.
93. Id. at 8634-35.
94. See Evan Stark, Black Violence: Racism and the Construction of Reality, 28
Clearinghouse Rev. 433, 435 (1994) (exploring the discriminatory "source" of the "portrait
of an underclass of violent, drug-abusing black males").
95. See Lee A. Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The
Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L Rev. 235, 270 (noting "the possibility that vast disparities
in wealth and income create conditions conducive to crime and rioting") (footnote
omitted); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
Duke L.J. 703, 789 (1994) (commenting that "disparities [in wealth] are at the root of
judgments of relative deprivation that can lead to feelings of government illegitimacy and
collective disorder, as in the recent Los Angeles riots").
96. See James A. Kushner, Growth Management and the City, 12 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
68, 77 (1994) (observing that "minority urban school districts are unable to finance good
schools and unable to cope with the special educational needs and problems of today's
urban students who lack the traditional preparation and familial support provided in many
suburban districts") (footnote omitted).
97. See Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 739, 757 (1993)
(asserting that "[d]iscriminatory zoning practices have created and perpetuated separate
residential communities for African-Americans") (footnote omitted).
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tion98 and imagery. 99 But none of these factors or strategies effectively
naturalizes the character of black male deviance or normalizes the racial
category of deviance. 100
C. Dqfiance Narratives
Claims of natural or normal racially deviant identity compete daily
with community-based narratives of defiance. These narratives denatural-
ize the racial character attributions of deviance theory that bolster stereo-
types of, and discrimination against, black men.' 0 ' Faal's direct examina-
tion of Danny Bakewell, a community activist and a defense witness, at the
Williams-Watson sentencing hearing, elicited an illustrative form of com-
munity-based narrative. Employing the term "rebellion," Faal asked
whether Bakewell realized that the violence in South Central Los Angeles
"came on the heels" of a "not guilty verdict" in the beating of Rodney
King.102 Bakewell answered:
There is a tremendous feeling of rejection on the part of the
community. There is a tremendous feeling of injustice that is
consistently perpetrated on the community. There is a tremen-
dous feeling that no matter what the circumstances are and what
exists we will always-and the system will always find a way to
persecute us even in circumstances where we have been vindi-
cated. I think that adds to a very demoralized community.
103
Deputy District Attorney Janet Moore objected to this line of ques-
tioning, complaining about the "political" nature of such testimony.1
0 4
Faal replied that the alleged crimes occurred under circumstances suffi-
ciently "unusual" to constitute evidence of mitigation admissible at sen-
tencing.'0 5 The court sustained the objection, finding "no relevance" in
Bakewell's testimony about "some general feeling" of community
"injustice."106
The court's ruling sliows the difficulty of translating community-
based defiance narratives into the discourse of liberal legalism, here re-
flected in substantive standards of criminal law and evidence. By sus-
taining Moore's objection, the court serves to "personalize[ ] causal re-
98. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1945,
1946-61 (1993).
99. See Sheri L. Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1739
(1993).
100. On the normalization of deviance in the context of difference, see Brad Sears,
Case Comment, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The (Dys)Functional Approach
in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 559, 575 (1994) (describing societal
process of constructing deviance illustrated by the term "queer").
101. See Austin, supra note 39, at 1773 ("Deviance confirms stereotypes and plays into
the hands of an enemy eager to justify discrimination.").
102. Record, supra note 1, at 8529.
103. Id. at 8530.
104. See id. at 8531.
105. See id. at 8532.
106. Id. at 8533.
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sponsibility" for criminal or otherwise self-destructive behavior associated
with the black "underclass."10 7 Personalizing responsibility permits the
criminal justice system to punish individual acts of lawbreaking in a man-
ner compatible with liberal theory.
Accordingly, when Faal again attempted to introduce evidence expli-
cating Williams's conduct in light of the "factors that caused the riots,"
Moore protested, doubting how "exploration of the cause of the riot per-
tains to why Mr. Williams picked up a brick and threw [it] into the side of
Reginald Denny's head" and redirecting "focus on Mr. Williams, Mr.
Williams' [s] choices, Mr. Williams' [s] conduct."1 08 As before, the court
permitted this protest; it demanded "to hear about Mr. Williams' [s] par-
ticipation and what's unusual about the circumstances at that particular
time and place as it relates to Damian Williams. Nothing else."'
0 9 The
court admonished Faal: "[T]his is not the place to talk about the politics
of riots, in general, or this particular riot."110
Despite courts' commitment to the separation of law and politics and
to the personalization of criminal responsibility under a regime of liberal
legalism, critical race theorists continue to assert the relevance of com-
munity-based defiance narratives. Regina Austin, for example, locates
such community-based narratives in the criminal behavior of black "law-
breakers."' The narratives combine the civil rights discourse of "racial
justice" with the militant nationalist discourse of "race resistance" to fash-
ion a "politics of identification."" 2 Consistent with this politics, Austin
explains, "'the black community' "evaluates black lawbreaking "behavior
in terms of its impact on the overall progress of the race.""
3 The com-
munity praises criminal behavior that generates "a positive impact on the
social, political, and economic well-being of black communal life" and
scorns behavior that provokes a deleterious effect."
4
107. See Charles W. Mills, Under Class Under Standings, 104 Ethics 855, 858 (1994)
(reviewing Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy Race, Poverty, and the
Underclass (1992) and The Underclass Question (Bill E. Lawson ed., 1992)) (mentioning
that term underclass "mystifies and stigmatizes, begging crucial questions about causation
and agency").
108. Record, supra note 1, at 8532-33.
109. Id. at 8534.
110. Id.
111. See Austin, supra note 39, at 1774 (observing that the black community "chooses
to identify itself with its lawbreakers and does so as an act of defiance").
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1772.
114. Id.; see also Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/
Deviance Divide, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 877, 878 (1992) (pointing out that the black
community excludes from "good standing" some of those considered deviant by whites
because they undermine community "claims to greater respect and a larger share of the
nation's bounty"); Kennedy, supra note 65, at 1255 (addressing the importance of "efforts
to control criminality" in the black community).
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For Austin, the acts of black lawbreakers exemplify a form of "direct
action" politics" 5 as well as a "kind of resistance against material and
cultural subjugation."" 6 Although the "impolitic ways"" 7 of resistance
may not grow into a full-blown political strategy of direct action," 8 they
represent a "critical challenge to white supremacy" 9 consonant with the
militant tradition of black nationalism. 20 Searching this tradition, Gary
Peller contends that black nationalism supplies an "alternative, coherent,
and reasoned analysis of the meaning of racial domination.' 12 1 Such an
analysis, he points out, repudiates the liberal integrationist ideology of
colorblind, racial transcendence.' 22
Austin's lawbreaker thesis aims to transform, rather than transcend,
notions of criminal behavior.'23 Her mission is to reconfigure lawbreak-
ing into a responsible politics of difference that contributes to the collec-
tive security and welfare of the black community.' 24 Reconfiguration fur-
nishes lawbreakers with a chance for "redemption" not only in the
criminal justice system, but also in the broader socioeconomic system.' 25
Echoing these conceptions at the Williams-Watson sentencing hearing,
Faal pressed the court to grant Williams "a second chance," a chance to
"reform himself and be a productive citizen." 126 Reform and redemption
hinge on deciphering the social or collective meaning of difference em-
115. Austin, supra note 39, at 1791 ("Lawbreaker culture supports the use of direct
words and direct action that more refined segments of society would find distasteful.").
116. Id. at 1780.
117. Austin, supra note 114, at 879.
118. See Austin, supra note 39, at 1787 ("The lawbreakers' rebellion is limited
because it is not based on a thoroughgoing critique that attacks the systemic sources of
their material deprivation.").
119. Austin, supra note 114, at 879.
120. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke LJ. 758, 763, 812 (explicating
marginalization of black nationalism as "extremist ideology").
121. Id. at 763. Peller notes that "black nationalists asserted a positive and liberating
role for race consciousness, as a source of community, culture, and solidarity to build upon
rather than transcend." Id. at 761.
122. See id. at 769; see also David R. Papke, The Black Panther Party's Narratives of
Resistance, 18 Vt. L. Rev 645, 661 (1994) (disclosing that "[Black Panther Party] ideology
told a story of the oppression of African-Americans and, more importantly, projected
liberation through the concentrated efforts of a boldly politicized lumpen proletariat of
color").
123. See Austin, supra note 114, at 887 (urging transformation of "the boundary
between difference and deviance into free space, a time and place in which racial, sexual,
and economic emancipation can be imagined, experimented with, and even enjoyed").
124. See id. at 878-79 ("Theirs is a deviance that is different because it is defiant and
resistant of the racial status quo; these deviants are likely to be admired by other blacks for
just that reason.").
125. See Austin, supra note 39, at 1815.
126. Record, supra note 1, at 8637, 8647.
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bedded in historical practices of opposition and subordination, 127 espe-
cially "difference turned violent."128
Black lawbreakers exhibit what Austin Sarat and Roger Berkowitz call
"disorderly differences," that is, "differences that threaten society's alleg-
edly fragile harmony and stability."129 Sarat and Berkowitz claim that pre-
vailing theories of liberal legalism 3 0 and civic republicanism' 3' fail to
embrace difference, despite pronouncements of tolerance and commu-
nity. They ascribe this failure to an erroneous construction of difference
as disorderly.132  Faal summoned this construction in depicting
Williams's "background" and "thoughtlessness." 33
Instead of disorder' 34 and danger, 3 5 however, difference brings the
promise of an "orderly"' 36 realignment of racialized social practices. 137
Faal alluded to the promise of realignment through education, noting
127. See Peller, supra note 120, at 794 (searching "historical structures" of racial
community and oppression for "social meaning").
128. Austin Sarat & Roger Berkowitz, Disorderly Differences: Recognition,
Accommodation, and American Law, 6 Yale J.L. & Human. 285, 287 (1994).
129. Id. at 287. Sarat and Berkowitz comment:
When acted upon, disorderly differences impose themselves violently and brutally
on others. They forcefully present the question of when and how differences can
(and should) be recognized and accommodated. Disorderly differences require
us to ask whether we can (or should) justify or excuse conduct which, while
seemingly reprehensible to us, reflects another person's deeply felt cultural or
religious conviction.
Id. at 287-88 (footnotes omitted).
130. See id. at 309 ("[T]hrough collective appeal to a rationally governed civic realm,
liberals imagine that disorderly differences can be made orderly.") (footnote omitted).
131. See id. at 311-12 (claiming that civic republicanism "posits values, or the pursuit
of values, that can bring unity out of apparent diversity and, in this way, denies the
desirability of maintaining and supporting meaningful difference").
132. See id. at 307 (contending that "although liberalism and civic republicanism
purport to balance the competing imperatives of freedom and order, both are ultimately
deeply hostile to difference because they construct difference as disorderly").
133. Record, supra note 1, at 7914, 8642.
134. See Sarat & Berkowitz, supra note 128, at 304 ("Before difference can be
recognized and accommodated, we must stop seeing difference as the prelude to
disorder.").
135. See id. at 297 ("For law to welcome difference it must code that difference in a
way that tames its disordering potential and reassures itself and its audience that difference
is not dangerous."). I
136. Sarat & Berkowitz call for a reconceptualization of the meaning of order. See id.
at 289. They explain:
[F]riends of difference must learn to think and speak about order-indeed, to
recognize order as the indispensable partner of difference itself. What is
required is not only a more accommodating understanding of difference, but also
an enhanced vocabulary for speaking about order. All too often, the friends of
difference refuse to speak of order, in so doing, we leave the field to others. As a
result, the potential for orderly difference remains unrealized.
Id. at 289-90 (footnote omitted).
137. Cf. id. at 312 ("Our law knows no way to celebrate difference as a site of
alternative visions of orderliness or to recognize the potential within differences to instruct
others about useful realignments in existing practices.") (footnote omitted).
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that a "lack of education is a significant contributing factor to criminal or
deviant conduct."138 Williams, he admitted, had not been "diligent" in
pursuing an education. 139 Because Williams "had not seen education as a
priority in his life," Faal elaborated, "he's in the problem that he is here
today. If he had gone on to complete his high school and gone to college
most likely he wouldn't be sitting before you here today."140 To Faal,
Williams can be "rescue Ed]" and his disorderly differences cured?1
4'
Faal's vision of rescue and realignment flows from an indigenous
politics of difference within the black community. This politics generates
defiance narratives antedating the narratives of black nationalism.
Austin's elucidation of the "resistance" narratives accompanying the
Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-1956 and the more recent Los Angeles
consumer boycotts unearths the historical roots of defiance narratives.
142
Like Ackerson's and Faal's defiance narratives, resistance narratives con-
test the deviant "pathologies of subordination and repression" assigned to
the black community.143
Although defiance and resistance narratives draw on a powerful tra-
dition of community struggle, they do not address the destructive effects
of deviance narratives in legal storytelling. Deviance narratives of mob
behavior are essentialist and invidious, not colorblind. Hence, they war-
rant race-conscious challenge. Applauding elements of rebellion or
revolution in black criminal behavior provides no such challenge.' 44
Even if those lesser elements of defiance narrative buttress a defense of
race-motivated retribution or retaliation,' 45 they offer nothing to counter
the dominant narrative of racialized deviance and moral irresponsibility.
Conventional ethical regimes of liberal legalism tolerate that dominance.
II. ETHicAL REGimEs
Conventional ethical regimes condone the use of racialized deviance
narratives in defense of black male lawbreakers. The regimes rely for au-
thority on texts woven by both contractarian and communitarian strands
of liberal theory: the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of
138. Record, supra note 1, at 8648.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 8649.
142. See Austin, supra note 38, at 155. See generally Jo Ann G. Robinson, The
Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who Started It (DavidJ. Garrow ed., 1987).
143. Peller, supra note 120, at 818.
144. See Mills, supra note 107, at 869 ("It would clearly be absurd, and morally
irresponsible, to take the position of some elements of the white Left in the late
1960s-early 1970s that all black criminal activity is somehow 'revolutionary.' ").
145. For a discussion of defense strategies based on male characterizations of
justifiable retaliation in domestic violence cases, see Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and




Professional Responsibility' 46 and the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.' 47 Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules expressly
sanction the use of racialized narratives. 148 Each affirms, however, a col-
orblind vision of practice susceptible to racialized forms of narrative.
This susceptibility stems from the core principles of conventional ethics:
partisanship and nonaccountability. By now familiar, these principles es-
tablish the partisan injunction of zealous advocacy' 49 and the corollary
license of moral nonaccountability. 15 0 The fusion of aggressive advo-
cacy' 5 ' and pretextual neutrality152 results in. a colorblind standard con-
ception of role morality'5 3 that allows lawyers to deny and, at the same
time, to exploit racial difference without professional consequences.
146. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1983).
147. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983). The ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice provide an additional source of regulation. See Standards for Criminal Justice
(1994).
148. On the tactical use of bias and prejudice in criminal defense advocacy, see Eva S.
Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 1 (1994).
149. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1729,
1757-58 (1993); see also David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 12 (1988)
[hereinafter Luban, Lawyers and Justice] (asserting that "[a] lawyer must, within the
established constraints on professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the client's
objectives will be attained"); Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 Clev. St. L. Rev.
175, 184 (1983-1984) (discussing criminal lawyer "tradition of unmitigated devotion to the
client's interest"); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 589, 605 (1985) (recognizing that "[the force of the bar's deontological claims
derives in large measure from the criminal defense paradigm, where the case for undiluted
partisanship is most compelling"). See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L.
Rev. 1469 (1966).
150. See Luban, Lawyers andJustice, supra note 149, at 7, 393-403 ("'When acting as
an advocate for a client . . . a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally
accountable for the means used or the ends achieved.'") (quoting Murray L. Schwartz,
The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 671, 673 (1978)).
151. See William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1703,
1703 (1993) (criticizing ethical basis of "aggressive criminal defense" practice).
152. See GeraldJ. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 63, 73 (1980) ("[Olnce he has accepted the client's case, the lawyer must represent
the client, or pursue the client's objectives, regardless of the lawyer's opinion of the client's
character and reputation, and the moral merits of the client's objectives."); Ted Schneyer,
Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1529, 1534
("Neutrality requires a lawyer to practice without regard to her personal views concerning
either a client's character or the moral status of his objectives.").
153. Cf. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum.
Rts. 1, 12-13 (1975) (discussing lawyers' "role-differentiated amorality"); Charles P. Curtis,
The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 21-23 (1951-1952) (approving detached
treatment of advocacy as a game or a craft); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale LJ. 1060, 1066 (1976)
(defending moral validity of the lawyer's professional role); Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 613, 614-15 (justifying the lawyer'i amoral professional role).
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A. Race and Liberal Theory
The ethic of race-conscious responsibility derives from an alterna-
tive, still evolving vision of legal practice animated by respect for client
racial difference. Three principles distinguish this vision: race-con-
sciousness, contingency, and collectivity. The principle of race-conscious-
ness acknowledges racial difference as a crucial component of individual
client and community identity. The principle of contingency decenters
the client as an autonomous subject unconnected to community contexts
and unconstrained by sociolegal practices. The principle of collectivity
holds lawyers and clients jointly responsible for the community harm
caused by racialized narratives. Application of these principles disrupts
the liberal conventions of criminal defense ethics. Disruption of the
often rehearsed ethics of criminal defense advocacy comes from internal
critique and rebellion instigated by clients opposed to the dominant nar-
rative of lawyer-devised deviance case theory'54 as well as from external
critique questioning the epistemic and normative commitments of devi-
ance case theory. Both internal and external critiques challenge the ordi-
nary, common sense conventions of criminal defense practice.
Consider the Williams and Watson defense teams' use of expert wit-
ness testimony to support a group contagion theory of diminished capac-
ity. The use of expert testimony to establish an objective basis for excus-
ing or justifying lawbreaking behavior represents a standard epistemic
tactic in criminal cases. To that end, the defense teams put forward the
claim of black male deviance as a neutral and an objective phenomenon
open to empirical verification. In her opening statement, Ackerson char-
acterized the events in South Central Los Angeles as a chaotic "explosion
of anger" by individuals who "came from their homes.., somewhat con-
fused... hostile and apparently upset over the Rodney King verdicts."' 55
These individuals, she pointed out, found "absolutely, positively no police
presence... no direction .. no control.., no organization... no order
... no figures of authority.., absolutely no guidance" when they entered
into a crowd and succumbed to "complete anarchy.' 56 Faal's direct ex-
amination of Morales adduced testimony that young males predominate
in violent group contagion behavior, motivated in large part by "frustra-
tion" and "anger."
157
Taken together, Ackerson and Faal seem to suggest that black male
deviance, manifested in lawbreaking violence, rises out of frustration and
anger over socioeconomic inequality. Indeed, during his cross-examina-
tion of Dr. Paul Tracy, a criminologist and a prosecution witness, Faal
154. Clark Cunningham and Lucie White sketch powerful renderings of internal
client critique and rebellion. See Cunningham, supra note 29, at 1329-31; Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
G., 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 21-32 (1990).
155. Record, supra note 1, at 3295-96.
156. Id. at 3296.
157. See id. at 7127.
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asked: "Would you concede that in situations where individuals act col-
lectively in a violent manner that sometimes their conduct has nothing to
[do] with socialization, but was motivated by their frustration over inequi-
ties?"158 Ackerson pressed further, indicating that the black community
collapses into violent anarchy when deprived of the direction, control,
and organization of an external authority figure, namely, the police. By
this, Ackerson intimates that the black community lacks the internal re-
sources to provide moral guidance to its members and to maintain civil
order on its streets. This far-ranging implication reveals the problem of
iterability in racialized criminal defense strategies. Defined as "the capac-
ity to be repeated in new contexts,"159 iterability pushes racialized narra-
tives out of the narrow, juridical arena into the broader field of culture
and society where the narratives change from a concrete description of
two young black males to an abstract generalization about all young black
males.
Additionally, following the conventions of criminal defense practice,
the defense teams pursued a rights-based advocacy strategy to protect
Williams and Watson against the wrongful incursions of the "powerful
state.' 60 Both teams, for example, joined in a pretrial defense motion of
"discriminatory prosecution.' 6 1 Furthermore, Faal claimed that "some
of the charges, particularly the charge for aggravated mayhem and at-
tempted murder were filed for improper political reasons."162 Specifi-
cally, he contended that "the prosecution intentionally and arbitrarily dis-
criminated against [Williams and Watson] because: (a) they are black,
and (b) they are not police officers.' 63 The normative value underlying
this defense tactic finds roots in a deep-seated liberal commitment to
"safeguard" individual rights.16 4
The exploitation of race in criminal cases, such as the Williams-
Watson case, taints the foundational principles of neutrality, objectivity,
and individual rights enforcement, thereby putting customary liberal be-
liefs and values in controversy. Recall the defense teams' reliance on ex-
158. Id. at 7315.
159. J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 1131, 1133 (1994).
160. See CharlesJ. Ogletree, Jr., BeyondJustifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1257-58, 1275-76 (1993) (describing heroic
"glory" of public defenders engaged in "fighting the state"); see also David Luban,
Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1028-29 (1990) (urging protection of
individuals against public and private institutions that "pose chronic threats to their well-
being"); cf. David Wasserman, Should A Good Lawyer Do the Right Thing? David Luban
on the Morality of Adversary Representation, 49 Md. L. Rev. 392, 404 (1990) (declaring
that duty of unqualified advocacy "cannot justify' every act of zeal").
161. See Record, supra note 1, at 1632-59.
162. Id. at 6192, 1405.
163. Id. at 1652.
164. Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665, 671
(1994) (analyzing rights-based justifications for neutral partisanship).
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pert opinion to substantiate the claim of diminished capacity. Conven-
tional ethical regimes treat that reliance as value-neutral with respect to
the form of the direct examination and the content of the elicited testi-
mony. The counter-regime of race-conscious responsibility views that
same reliance as a racialized strategy of extracting deviant narrative. By
privileging a narrative of racial deviance, the defense teams help consti-
tute165 black men and their communities in terms of pathological vio-
lence. In a sense, the defense "color-coded" criminal violence.
1. The Contractarian Model. - Liberal theory tolerates racialized or
color-coded criminal defense strategies on individualist and communitar-
ian grounds. The individualist account posits a contractarian model of
the lawyer-client relationship the plausibility of which rests on a cluster of
limiting assumptions. Deprived of these underpinnings, the model col-
lapses. A threshold assumption concerns client rationality or compe-
tence. Negotiation of the lawyer-client contractual relationship requires
independent, rational client decisionmaking. Competence serves as a
precondition for reasoned client judgments. The next assumption per-
tains to client willful, voluntary action. The lawyer-client contractual rela-
tionship grows out of free, arm's length bargaining. As such, it expresses
the voluntarist preferences of unencumbered client will. A further as-
sumption regards the vitality of client knowledge and consent. Parties to
a contractual relationship prudently seek full information before reach-
ing an accord. Information that goes to the nature of the transaction
under negotiation, here for legal services, facilitates lawyer-client consen-
sual exchange.
In accord with these abstract and generalized assumptions, a lawyer
undertakes an express duty to implement the rationally expressed and
voluntarily espoused will or preference of a client. That duty entails a
distant, deferential stance to the ordered liberty of client preferences, 166
thereby casting the lawyer-client relationship as a meeting of private,
rather than public or political, agents.' 67 This separation or splitting off
of the public from the private conforms to the moral psychology of liberal
individualism.'
68
165. See Sara Cobb &Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality
in Mediation, 16 Law & Soc. Inquiry 35, 39 (1991) (noting that "language functions to
constitute 'reality' and masks its own role in that process").
166. Misgivings about client competence dispel this deferential attitude. See Norman
G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist Counsel and Make Decisions in Criminal Cases,
18 L. & Hum. Beh. 437, 450 (1994) (finding "that clients whose competence is doubted are
disproportionately passive in their overall involvement in their .defense, and that the
majority of defendants, whether perceived as being of doubtful competence or not, are
actively involved in the key decisions in which legal norms mandate personal
involvement").
167. On legal representation as a "political" relationship, see John Leubsdorf,
Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 825, 840 (1992).
168. Cf. Linda R. Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94




Liberal thought conceives of individual personality in terms of "self-
authentication and self-command."16 9 The liberal subject imagines its
self to be "in charge of its own thoughts and actions," and thus, to be the
"spontaneous author of plans and doer of acts inspired by its own cogni-
tions, calculations, and desires."170 On this conception, the client subject
is "ethically several, interest-bearing, self-activating, communicative, and
self-conscious (or self-reflective)."' 71 Construed by Euro-American legal
discourse, the client subject devolves into a " 'natural rights-bearing per-
son' " positioned "against the interests of the collectivity."
172
The contractarian model becomes valid when these rationalist, con-
sensual, and voluntarist assumptions match up with some objective reality.
Certain circumstances weaken the assumptions, dissipating the force of
the model and, hence, the cogency of an individualist justification for
racialized criminal defense strategies. Otherwise competent clients, for
instance, may perceive the need for deliberative, reason-giving assistance
before exercising their decisionmaking powers. Similarly, clients may
sense that laws and sociolegal practices inhibit their ability to engage in
willful, voluntary acts. Likewise, clients may feel prodded to assent to law-
yer-devised defense strategies despite lingering doubts and reservations.
Such alternate factual renderings of the lawyer-client relationship
suggest that the baseline assumptions accompanying the contractarian
model falter when extended beyond narrow, simplified grounds. Strict
adherence to those grounds requires an ideal agency situation of freely
chosen, reasoned client action. Legal consciousness and culture, how-
ever, preclude a situation of client agency free of the structural con-
straints of laws, legal institutions, and legal actors. Yet, structural con-
straints lack the power to bind agency totally.'73 In the arena of criminal
advocacy, client agency and legal structure have no fixed valence; instead,
their interplay "varies" across contexts and over time.'7 That drift yields
contextual instability marked by changing conditions of client freedom
and constraint. Thus, notwithstanding contractarian premises, the client-
fashioned liberal subject inhabits a position of only relative freedom.
169. Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of Liberalism, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1807, 1809
(1994) (reviewingJohn Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1812.
172. Jeanne L. Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction,
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 585, 594 (1994).
173. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2548
(1994) (remarking that "it is not necessary to view the individual subject as either wholly
free or wholly constrained by social forces").
174. Cf. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 Conn. L.
Rev. 869, 870 (1993) (arguing that "[sityles of legal argument, theories of jurisprudence,




2. The Communitarian Model. - The flawed contractarian presuppo-
sition of free-wheeling client subjectivity opens the way for a communitar-
ian revision of criminal defense strategies. A communitarian account
presents a deliberative model of the lawyer-client relationship tailored to
address the hard choices clients confront daily in advocacy contexts
where their freedom is constrained. Deliberation is warranted because
the individualist canons of utility and wealth maximization give clients
little indication when to seek lawyer assistance, how to act in response to
sociolegal constraints, or whether to assent to lawyer-driven schemes to
overcome such constraints.
Communitarian canons, in contrast, guide client resolution of hard
choices by encouraging a deliberative process that affirms the value of
civic virtue. 175 Inculcating this value involves lawyer-client deliberations
of character and community. Character deliberations comprehend client
rational choice in terms of the ability to grasp the moral implications of
advocacy strategies.176 This construction defines client rationality in
terms of moral analysis. 177 Community deliberations understand client
consensual, voluntarist decisionmaking in terms of the ability to appre-
hend the social purposes of advocacy.178 On this approach, client deci-
sionmaking entails a democratic sensitivity to the common good.
179
Despite the presence of communitarian strands of obligation, con-
ventional ethical regimes neglect lawyer-client deliberations of character
175. See Amy Gutmann, Can Virtie Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1759,
1759, 1765 (1993) (finding virtue in "the disposition and capacity of lawyers to deliberate
with nonlawyers (call us ordinary people) about the practical implications of legal action
and its alternatives" through "a mutual interchange of information and understanding
oriented toward decision making about both ends and means").
176. For Susan Wolf, possession of this ability evinces the normative competence "to
recognize and appreciate a set of reasons sufficient to show which action or choice would
be right." Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason 124, 143 (1990); see also Martha C.
Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1627,
1630-33 (1993).
177. See Reed E. Loder, Moral Skepticism and Lawyers, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 47, 82
(contending that "careful moral analysis in its widest dimension, which includes
imagination and feeling, is essential to justifying moral action and thus is essential to being
moral").
178. Cf. Walter Probert, The Lawyer as Moral Advisor: The Cohen Strategy, 15 J.
Legal Prof. 53, 58 (1990) ("A client should be warned that doing what is legal is not
necessarily what is best for him because of the risks of his own 'injury' by moral reaction
within his group or community.").
179. Anthony Cook lauds this sensitivity as an essential part of reconstructive
jurisprudence. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther KingJr., 103 Harv. L Rev. 985 (1990); Anthony E. Cook,
The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resurrecting the Value of Love




and community. Both the Model Code180 and the Model Rules, 181 in
fact, espouse deliberative values only to diminish their importance in
favor of the overarching principle of zealous advocacy. The standard cri-
tique of partisan advocacy adverts to this diminution in approving collat-
eral considerations of social justice.'8 2 The communitarian critique
broadens this endorsement asserting the two-fold obligation to help cli-
ents "live good lives"183 and reach "a mutual understanding of what jus-
tice in a constitutional democracy permits or demands."' 8 4
The communitarian joinder of character and community con-
ceptions of deliberation responds to the inadequacy of the contractarian
reading of lawyer-client mutuality and preference. Under conventional
ethical regimes, lawyers construe the preference of criminal defendants
mutually in terms of "winning acquittal or, if that fails, the lowest possible
sentence."' 8 5 When this preference is lacking and mutuality therefore is
not reached, lawyers blame inadequate client information or client mis-
apprehension. The communitarian model of deliberation'8 6 seeks to
180. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-9 ("[W]hen an action in the best
interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, [a lawyer] may ask his client for permission
to forego such action."); id. DR 7-101 (B) (1) ("Where permissible, [a lawyer may] exercise
his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client."); id. EC
7-8 ("In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally
permissible.").
181. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2.1 ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."); see also id. Rule 2.1
(comment) ("It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations
in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the
law will be applied.").
182. See Gutmann, supra note 175, at 1760 ("The standard critique of zealous
advocacy focuses on the need for lawyers to temper their defense of clients' causes with an
appreciation of the larger purpose of their legal actions: social justice."). Lawyers,
Gutman explains, "cannot know if and when they should be advocates without thinking
about the larger social purposes of law, in particular about the central place of law in
serving social justice in a constitutional democracy." Id. at 1762. Considerations of social
justice, she asserts, demand "the willingness and capacity of lawyers to act according to the
demands ofjustice, rather than the preferences (even the informed preferences) of their
clients when the two conflict." Id. at 1763.
183. Id. at 1767 (defending a "character conception of legal virtue"); see also Timothy
L. Hall, Moral Character, The Practice of Law, and Legal Education, 60 Miss. L.J. 511, 517
(1990) (asserting that "ethical acts are born out of the habits and inclinations of
character").
184. Gutmann, supra note 175, at 1764.
185. Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of
Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 73, 77 (1993).
186. See Gutmann, supra note 175, at 1761 (defining lawyer deliberative virtues to
"include the disposition to discuss various legal strategies with clients, and to understand




cure this inadequacy of information and understanding through
empathy. 8
7
The communitarian notion of deliberative empathy is predicated on
lawyers' good faith intentions, notwithstanding conventional skepticism
toward state of mind inferences.' 88 Deliberative empathy constitutes "an
unmediated engagement of the other,"189 what Milner Ball calls "devo-
tion to the other." 90 Connections of this sort come from empathetic lis-
tening. Cynthia Ward distinguishes two modes of empathic listening:
projective and imaginative.' 91 Projective empathy transcends difference
to ascertain the "essential humanity" of the other.192 Imaginative empa-
thy honors difference by "allow[ing] the empathizer to construct the
other as a completely separate being, thereby fully acknowledging the
other's diversity and removing the obstacles to perception one en-
counters in attempting to inject oneself into another's experience as a
way of understanding it."'u9
Ward's analysis is useful in illustrating empathic methods of promot-
ing equality' 94 inside the lawyer-client relation and recognizing inequal-
ity' 95 outside that relation. Nonetheless, empathy may be insufficient to
187. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 Ga. St. U. L.
Rev. 385 (1992) (proposing altruistic ethic of care and empathy in lawyering); Deborah L.
Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev.
1547, 1560 (1993) (noting that "skills of empathetic listening are not the unique preserve
of psychoanalysis"). But cf. Cynthia V. Ward, A Kindler, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of
Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 929, 931 (1994)
(contending that "empathy cannot validly be deployed either to attack liberal legalism or
to construct its replacement").
188. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On "Due
Process of Lawmaking" and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45
Hastings LJ. 1035, 1051 (1994) (arguing that there is "no basis for inferring from a
lawyer's stated arguments evidence as to his or her internal state of mind about the matter
in question").
189. Richard Weisberg, In Search of Faulkner's Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1776, 1784
(1994) (reviewingJay Watson, Forensic Fictions: The Lawyer Figure in Faulkner (1993))
(suggesting that Faulkner permits his characters "to break free from a dependence on
language and to enter the world ofjustice through experience").
190. Milner S. Ball, Power from the People, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1725, 1731 (1994)
(reviewing Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive
Law Practice (1992)).
191. See Ward, supra note 187, at 949.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 943. Ward adds:
Empathy must create a sense that the outsider's claims are just; it does so by
making us realize that were we in the circumstances of the other's life, we would
also make her claims. This capacity for empathic interaction to create a sense of
equality is vital to empathy's potential to combat racism and sexism, both of
which are based on a conviction of the inferiority of others.
Id.
195. See id. at 941 (indicating that "empathy can result in a realization of the unjust
inequalities created by law").
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create mutuality or dialogue between a lawyer and a client. Communitar-
ian regimes elevate lawyer-client dialogue to a first order of deliberation.
If dialogue cannot be attained, 196 the regimes retreat to a second order
of deliberation consisting of good faith lawyer-client debate over the
meaning of character and community.197 The constant at both levels of
deliberation is trust.
Empathic, second order deliberations of character and community
in criminal cases depend on lawyer-client trust.198 Racialized narratives
of deviance taint relationships of trust with clients from subordinated
communities of color. Indeed, by disparaging such communities, the
narratives impede empathic deliberative engagement with clients.' 99
Communitarian regimes that envision a democratic politics of delibera-
tive dialogue, civic virtue, and citizen participation200 ignore this race-
bound impediment.
Wendy Brown-Scott cites a similar oversight in assailing communitari-
anism as a "reform theory."20' Brown-Scott contends that the failure of
communitarian theory to confront and to eradicate racism "perpetuates
the practice of racial subordination."20 2 Subordination, in turn, excludes
196. Richard Delgado insists that "'[d]ialog won't work for systemic social ills,'"
explaining that" '[wie don't see-can't see-faults in the paradigm, the very structures by
which we communicate, make ourselves understood, and explain, understand, and
construct reality.'" Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and
the Politics of Denial, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1581, 1604 (1993). Racial dialogue fails, Delgado
notes, "'because we have assigned [Blacks] low status, low credibility in the stigma-pictures
we've made of them and still disseminate.'" Id.
197. Debate may extend to other legal actors and institutions, such as the jury. See
Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking theJury, 3 Win. & Mary Bill Rts.J. 29, 101 (1994) (arguing
that voir dire "should include an opportunity for lawyers and judges to sensitize jurors
about differences among decision-makers and about the social context of the case").
198. See Bill 0. Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 Stan. L.
Rev. 1807, 1807 (1993) (emphasizing development of lawyer relationships of trust with
indigent criminal clients from subordinated communities).
199. See Gutmann, supra note 175, at 1765 (claiming that deliberation "requires an
active engagement with clients that aims at a better understanding of the value of legal
action and its alternatives than either party to the deliberation probably had at the
outset").
200. See generally Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale LJ. 1493 (1988); Cass
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539 (1988).
201. See Brown-Scott, supra note 22, at 1210-11 (declaring communitarianism to be
"deficient unless modified from a race-conscious perspective"); see also Derrick Bell &
Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 Yale LJ. 1609, 1611 (1988)
(warning that "society retains racial domination as a consensus ideology by promising a
nondiscriminatory present while simultaneously locking in the racial disadvantages of our
blatantly racist past"); Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the
Political Community, 80 Geo. LJ. 1835, 1837 (1992) (asserting that "racism muffles and
silences the voices of minorities" in communal dialogue). But cf. Alex M.Johnson,Jr., The
New Voice of Color, 100 Yale LJ. 2007, 2011, 2058-61 (1991) (noting that scholars of
color embrace "communitarian/republican norms of political theory").
202. Brown-Scott, supra note 22, at 1211.
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clients and communities of color from full participation in the "delibera-
tive processes of defining community and values."203 Deliberative exclu-
sion squanders the valuable resources of such communities accumulated
from historical traditions of resistance and self-governance. 20 4 Moreover,
exclusion negates the pluralist values that inform the communitarian re-
spect for difference and its embrace of shared power.
205
To remedy the problem of exclusion, Brown-Scott proposes a race-
conscious revision of communitarian regimes, calling for spiritual trans-
formation or conversion to empathetic, loving relationships20 6 led by a
search for shared values and a reverence for difference. 207 Brown-Scott's
proposed revision proceeds from the premise that racism or, for our pur-
poses, racialized narrative, undercuts communitarian forms of delibera-
tion. Racism demeans the identity or personhood of the subject; further,
it distorts the bonds of, and thus reduces the potential for, community.
The colorblind discourse of empathic deliberation masks the tolerance of
racialized narrative under conventional ethical regimes. Engrafted from
liberal theory, the regimes reenact racial subordination in the lawyer-cli-
ent relation and reproduce patterns of subordination in legal culture and
consciousness. Investigating the "local processes" of reenactment and re-
production in the conventions of criminal defense advocacy and ethics
reveals the "macro social structures" of racial subordination and "pro-
vide[s] openings for creativity in reshaping those structures.
20 8
Postmodern theory maps those openings.
Postmodernist critique incites both the disruption and reconstruc-
tion of conventional ethical regimes. Unlike more corrosive accounts of
postmodernism, the instant critique seeks to destabilize the normative
203. Id. at 1211, 1217 n.40.
204. See id. at 1218 (noting that "the communitarian emphasis on collective
responsibility is consistent with certain traditional practices of African-American
communities").
205. See id. at 1218-22.
206. See id. at 1223. This conversion may be hindered by the tendency of dominant
legal agents to misjudge their own empathic motive. Cynthia Ward points out that
subordinate agents may in fact possess "the greatest incentive to be empathic." Ward,
supra note 187, at 950 ("The person at the bottom of the hierarchy must at some level be
aware that his well-being depends on the powerful other, and so has good reason to learn
that other's psychology in order to please her.").
207. See Brown-Scott, supra note 22, at 1224. Additionally, Brown-Scott urges the
deprivileging of whiteness through acts that "deny to whites the dominance and privilege
that comes with membership in the white community." Brown-Scott, supra note 22, at
1224. Further, she recommends structural transformations within community-forming
institutions to encourage people of color to participate in civic discourse and to foster
community dialogue. See id. at 1225. Moreover, she pushes for a relaxation of the public/
private dichotomy that regulates the separation of character and community deliberation.
See id. at 1226. Last, she reminds the "dominant" white community to "accept
responsibility for its complicity in the enslavement and persistent subordination of people
of color." Id. at 1227.
208. Susan S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 39, 41 (1992).
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program of criminal defense ethics precisely in order to counterpose a
more satisfactory alternative. Of necessity, that alternative normative
approach rests on unsteady foundational grounds.20 9 Foundational un-
certainty, however, is the defining characteristic of postmodern legal prac-
tice. The variability of legal advocacy and the mutability of legal ethics
complement this uncertainty. Postmodernism, in effect, explodes the al-
ready unsettled quality of legal practice to build a provisional and pro-
tean sense of normative understanding.
B. Race-ing Legal Ethics
The alternative ethic of race-conscious responsibility forges norma-
tive understanding out of the principles of race-consciousness, contin-
gency, and collectivity. Those principles attempt to transform the liberal
regime of colorblind criminal defense ethics from the perspective of
race.2 10 The transformative race-ing2 of legal ethics dictates the explicit
recognition of racial difference and subordination. Yet that recognition
nowhere guarantees a halt to racial subordination, for narratives of racial
difference themselves reinstall hierarchical meanings and deviant
images.212 In addition to naming race or unnaming race-neutrality,
213
209. For discussions of foundational uncertainty, see Kate Nash, The Feminist
Production of Knowledge: Is Deconstruction a Practice for Women? 47 Feminist Rev. 65,
72 (1994) (claiming "there is no methodical procedure for obtaining certain knowledge, as
modem philosophy of science supposes; knowledge consists in having, at best, good
reasons for holding the beliefs one holds about the world and, at least, no good reasons for
giving them up"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev.
741, 780 n.130 (1993) (maintaining that lack of "extra-human foundations for human
knowledge does not mean that knowledge is impossible").
210. On the conservative implication of colorblind narrative in liberal jurisprudence,
see Cook, Death of God, supra note 179, at 1512 ("[T]he narrative of colorblindness
suggests that the lesson we should draw from centuries of race-based laws, traditions, and
customs designed to subordinate blacks is that race should seldom be used as a criterion
for decisionmaking, even when its use purports to make restitution for the present effects
of a racist past.").
211. The term "race-ing" holds a complex genealogy. Kendall Thomas apparently
introduced the term at the Frontiers of Legal Thought Conference at Duke Law School in
1990 to describe the constructed meaning of race through speech/acts. See Charles
Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke
L.J. 431, 443 n.52. Subsequently, Jerome McCristal Gulp expanded the term to suggest
that while people are "raced," they "are also cultured and the two are interdependent."
Jerome McC. Culp,Jr., The MichaelJackson Pill: Equality, Race, and Culture, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 2613, 2617 (1994). To Gulp, there are "positive and negative sides to the issue of race.
Black people invent themselves as black people through culture and history." Id. Here, I
further enlarge usage of the term: to race legal ethics is to posit an alternative framework
of moral reasoning and normative understanding.
212. Compare Cook, Death of God, supra note 179, at 1513 (noting that "recognition
of racial difference has not been the cause of, but the occasion for, black exclusion and
subordination").
213. On the power of naming, see Jones, No Time for Trumpets, supra note 90, at
2368 ("It is only when the slave names or defines his own reality that she begins to have
power, that she begins to live."); Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family Repositioning
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therefore, the race-ing of ethics also demands opposition to the deviant
construction of racial identity in legal storytelling. To the extent that de-
viant constructions deny the "identity-based particularism" of racial expe-
rience, they falsify that experience. 214
Normative understanding derived from falsely constructed racial ex-
perience obstructs moral reasoning linked to the idea of "a mature black
identity."21 5 Cornel West introduces a "prophetic" framework of moral
reasoning basing "mature black self-love and self-respect on the moral
quality of black responses to undeniable racist degradation in the
American past and present."216 West explains that "a prophetic frame-
work encourages moral assessment of the variety of perspectives held by
black people and selects those views based on black dignity and decency
that eschew putting any group of people or culture on a pedestal or in
the gutter."217 He stresses that all of the diverse styles and modes of black
cultural and community expression "stand in need of ethical evalua-
tion."218 A "[m]ature black identity," he maintains, "results from an ac-
knowledgement of the specific black responses to white-supremacist
abuses and a moral assessment of these responses such that the humanity
of black people does not rest on deifying or demonizing others."219
The ethic of race-conscious responsibility pursues a postmodem
moral assessment of the demonizing narratives of black male deviance
espoused within criminal defense stories of racial violence. In tying both
deviance and defiance to racial oppression, the stories entangle clients in
a "profusion"220 of meaning emanating from their accommodation of
and resistance to legal structures of racial subordination. Some frag-
ments of meaning refer to deviance as a consequence of subordination,
indicating that racial oppression breeds a pathology of unruly accommo-
dation. In the context of the Williams-Watson trial, Williams appears to
suffer from this pathology, exhibiting signs of disorderly difference.
Other fragments allude to deviance as a defiant response to subordina-
tion, implying that oppression sparks retaliatory acts of resistance.
Watson evidently shares this proclivity. In this way, racialized storytelling
seems to consolidate and isolate deviance as the only recourse open to
black males living in subordinated communities, bowing to the con-
Lesbians in Legal Theory, 19 Signs 975, 992 (1994) ("Unnaming is an important, if
underutilized, form of resistance.").
214. Cook, Death of God, supra note 179, at 1515-16.
215. Cornel West, Black Leadership and.the Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning, in Race-ing
Justice, En-Gendering Power, supra note 16, at 390, 396.
216. Id. at 396.
217. Id. at 397.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. I borrow the term from Steve Winter. See Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a
Postmodem World, 6 Yale J.L. & Human. 233, 242 (1994); see also Allan C. Hutchinson,
Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1173, 1185 (1992)
(conceding "possibility" of interpretive "meaning" and "agreement").
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straints of legal practices that "both place limits of possibility on social
action and impose specific forms of discursive possibility."22 1
Postmodern moral assessment evaluates the boundaries of racialized
stories, constantly checking their configuration, meaning, and context.
This checking function requires ongoing judgments about "storytelling
genres, familiar stereotypes, and deeply rooted cultural myths." 22 2
Richard Sherwin places these judgments within the ambit of "effective
lawyering."2 23  To Sherwin, good lawyering judgment incorporates
"sound narrative analysis" of imagery, genre, and audience. 224
Postmodernist lawyering strives to upset the apparent soundness of domi-
nant narratives by interrogating their normative baseline and thereby di-
vulging what values they exclude or omit.225 At the same time, it seeks to
align an alternative normative framework comporting with the "images,
feelings, myths, and dramatic forms" 22 6 of subordinate narratives, such as
defiance or resistance narratives. 227 Normative realignment comes with-
out the expectation to achieve full historical truth or understanding. 228
The groundwork for an alternative normative foundation of criminal
defense advocacy and ethics lies in the context of advocacy itself. Indeed,
221. Hunt, supra note 24, at 31; see also Winter, supra note 220, at 244 (explaining
that "constraints cannot be avoided because they provide the enabling conditions of
possibility").
222. Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 Vt. L. Rev.
681, 708 (1994). Sherwin proclaims "the ineradicable need for judgment, the need to
reach particular outcomes in particular cases, and the need for belief to sustain the
meanings that legal stories and arguments call to mind for the sake ofjudgment." Id. He
adds that "capturing belief both in straightforward, causally-sequenced tales (of detection,
for instance) and in acausal, nonlinear stories (of isolated imagery or latent mythic
archetypes) is an inescapable part of the workaday world in which we live and in which law
and lawyers operate." Id. at 708-09.
223. Id. at 709.
224. Id. For Sherwin, sound narrative analysis entails:
choice of imagery, and the associations that one's images conjure; choice of
genre, and the narrative expectations that the genre produces; choice of role for
one's audience, and the passive deference to externally posited meaning
schemata or the active participation in the construction of meaning from interior
sources that the role invites.
Id. To be effective, Sherwin remarks, this "strategic narrative" analysis "must be
deliberately cultivated, consciously assessed, and reflexively practiced." Id.
225. See Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 New. Eng. L Rev. 751,
754 (1992) (arguing that "postmodern critique illuminates the underside of master
narratives, thereby exposing the subordination and marginality of alternative social visions
whose relegation to the status of exception to the rule, counter-tradition or minority
perspective can no longer be objectively justified").
226. Sherwin, supra note 222, at 681, 693.
227. See Papke, supra note 122, at 680 (explaining how Black Panther leaders "found
meaningful ways to present their individual lives, to construct a liberationist ideology, and
to critique legal institutions including the police[ ]" through the "primary tool" of
narrative).
228. See Hutchinson, supra note 220, at 1187 ("Lives can never be recovered or




contextual analysis uncovers normative values in the everyday practices of
criminal advocacy.229 Two such values stand out: physical integrity and
subjective autonomy. Physical integrity refers to the condition of a cli-
ent's body under threat of state pain-imposing or death-dealing acts of
violence, such as the penalties of imprisonment or death. Subjective au-
tonomy pertains to a client's capacity to make independent decisions in
accord with the norms of dignity and self-respect. Although categorically
distinct, the two concepts interlock. Violations of physical integrity exe-
cuted through pain or death may reduce and even obliterate subjective
autonomy. Moreover, encroachments on subjective autonomy through
coercion or constraint may infringe on physical integrity. For these rea-
sons, criminal defense lawyers struggle to protect the physical integrity
and preserve the subjective autonomy of their clients. Because those val-
ues "enable judgment or evaluation in a variety of different situations and
circumstances,"230 they transcend the context of a single client, group, or
community.
Criminal defense stories of black male deviance sever the normative
link between client physical integrity and subjective autonomy. This link
depends upon an integrated, ethical vision of the client as a corporeal
body and a moral agent. The imputed bestiality or pathology of deviance
distorts that vision by restricting the moral scope of client agency. Eleva-
tion of the value of safeguarding the client body from state interference
over the value of honoring client subjectivity in legal decisionmaking fur-
ther deforms that vision.
Privileging deviance and the body reduces the notion of client sub-
jectivity or personhood to the narrow concept of informed preference, a
liberal individualist category seemingly incompatible with difference-
based collective dignity. This diminution leaves a superficial basis for en-
gaging in normative lawyer-client dialogue and deliberation. According
to Pierre Schlag, "values are ontologically superficial to the extent that
they are relegated to subordinate or derivative forms of being of an indi-
vidual or a group."231 The autonomy-based value of informed preference
constitutes a subordinate or derivative form of being. Subordination re-
sults from the source, framework, and background of advocacy informa-
tion. Lawyers provide the main source of advocacy information; acts of
informing flow from their primary understanding of the juridical world.
These acts, in turn, frame clients' comprehension of available options
and, by extension, their realm of preferences. The ultimate expression of
those preferences occurs in a lawyer-dependent, isolated setting stripped
of community.
229. See Winter, supra note 220, at 235 ("Values are not to be found elsewhere,
outside ourselves and our practices; they are profoundly human products made real by
human action.").
230. Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YaleJ.L. & Human. 219, 220 (1994).
231. Id. at 225.
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Insofar as such preferences properly influence criminal defense
strategies, they nonetheless deny the full moral "charge"23 2 of subjectivity
bound up in the values of individual dignity and collective decency.
West's idea of mature black self-love and self-respect endows the values of
dignity and decency with ontological depth. For Schlag, "[v]alues are
ontologically deep to the extent that they constitute the dominant forms
of being of an individual or a group."233 Historically, racial dignity and
decency symbolize the dominant aspirational forms of being within the
black community. Racialized narratives of deviance degrade the onto-
logical status of black dignity and decency.
The principle of race-consciousness restores the ontological status of
the dignity-based value of subjective autonomy in the legal context of ra-
cial subordination. Drawing on antislavery traditions, the principle con-
fers a measure of "autonomy sufficient to allow self-definition and sub-
stantial moral choice."23 4 Defiance narratives communicate self-defini-
tion and moral choice by displaying the interpretive capacity to "reap-
propriate and revalue" 235 racial identity in spite of subordination. Race-
conscious contextual analysis maps the constraints and possibilities of in-
terpretive reappropriation in criminal defense practice. The analysis fo-
cuses on race-related constraints on choice, evaluating the client's capac-
ity to exercise choice given his racial experience and the "particularistic
modes of decision-making" available under subordinating conditions.
2 3 6
The principle of contingency extends this contextual analysis to the
legal subject. Steve Winter finds the subject "embodied in a field of social
interaction." 237 Shaped by discourse, the field provides the "formative
context" for and the site of the "ongoing production" of meaning.23 8
This dual function means that the embodied subject is both constituted
by and constitutive of fields of meaning-making.2 39 Embodiment con-
demns the subject to a "multiple, contextual and protean" sense of
identity.2 40
232. The term stems from Pierre Schlag. See id. at 222.
283. Id. at 225.
234. Peggy C. Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 1348, 1349 (1994).
235. Winter, supra note 220, at 245.
236. Mark Tushnet, Spite Fences and Scholars: Why Race Is and Is Not Different, 26
Conn. L. Rev. 285, 292 (1993). Tushnet praises critical race theory scholars for
investigating "more particularistic modes of decision-making" in law and society. Id. This
investigation, he notes, challenges claims to universalism espoused by defenders of the
dominant culture. See id.
237. Winter, supra note 220, at 244.
238. Id.
239. See Balkin, supra note 174, at 886 ("We are constituted by the culture that we
collectively make through our acts of reason and persuasion."); Hutchinson, supra note
220, at 1185 ("[C]ommunicating subjects are themselves constituted in and through...
discourse itself.").
240. Hutchinson, supra note 220, at 1185.
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The fluid and often contradictory nature of subjective identity24' in
no way abrogates moral responsibility. Indeed, Winter notes that the em-
bodied subject "is always already implicated as a responsible actor" in a
particular field of action.2 42 The implication of subjective identity in
fields of social action creates a legal consciousness 243 of responsibility
contingent on collective social practices and contexts. The collective ori-
gins of responsibility reconfigure subjective autonomy in decisionmaking
"more as a public project than a private undertaking."244 Reconfigura-
tion connects autonomy to a community-based vision of dignity and self-
respect.
2 4 5
Connecting autonomy and community permits both lawyers and cli-
ents to construct "new meanings and possibilities" of identity.2 46 In the
absence of "an a priori stable essence" to fuel identity,24 7 reconstitution
must be socially contingent. For postmodernists, social contingency sets
the "precondition for.truth."248 Conceiving of a client as a "contingent
self"249 implies a capacity for self-constitution and self-determined re-
sponsibility. Meir Dan-Cohen distinguishes between a free will paradigm,
where responsibility is "a matter of what we choose to do," and a constitu-
tive paradigm, where responsibility is "a matter of what and who we
are."25 0 Working within a constitutive paradigm, Dan-Cohen mentions
"the self's ability to identify with various elements and thereby integrate
241. See id. at 1192, 1214 ("In a postmodern perspective, identity is always
constructed, often inconsistent and occasionally self-contradictory.").
242. Winter, supra note 220, at 243-44 ("There can be no possibility of
transcendence when our very ability to have a world is contingent on the kinds of bodies
that we have and the ways in which those bodies interact with our physical and social
environment.").
243. Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey describe sociolegal consciousness "as something
local, contextual, pluralistic, filled with conflict and contradiction," but not without "shape
and pattern." Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance:
An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 New. Eng. L. Rev. 731, 742 (1992). They
emphasize the "collective construction and the constraints" molding consciousness "in any
particular setting or community" and "the subject's work in making interpretations and
affixing meanings." Id.
244. Hutchinson, supra note 220, at 1193.
245. But cf. Markus D. Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and
Punishment, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1577, 1620 (1994) (noting "Hegel's emphasis on the
offender's continued membership in our community of rational persons and on the
offender's dignity as a fellow rational person").
246. Bartlett, supra note 173, at 2548 (asserting that "[m]eaning and identity are
continually shaped by social arrangements and institutions and at the same time
continually reshaped by the interventions of individuals").
247. The phrase comes from Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92
Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1449 (1992).
248. Winter, supra note 220, at 235.
249. Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 959, 965 (1992). Dan-Cohen understands human beings not in terms of "some
essential properties or in terms of a fixed, unalterable nature," but in terms of contingency
and plasticity. Id.
250. Id. at 961.
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them into itself, or to distance itself from them by objectifying them and
holding them at arm's length."
251
The ability of the subject to decenter and reconstitute itself in the
context of legal advocacy, Winter suggests, affirms "the subject's sense of
self as the self-directing author of its practices and expose[s] the subject
as but a contingent incident of those ongoing practices."252 This dis-
closure places the subject in a "constantly contingent condition of provi-
sionality 253 that enables it to redefine and relocate the bonds of its own
moral responsibility outside the free will or voluntarist paradigm of mod-
em liberal theory.254 Dan-Cohen contributes two meanings potentially
useful to the formulation of a postmodern, race-conscious ethical respon-
sibility: "object-responsibility" and "subject-responsibility."25 5 The act of
"assuming or refusing to assume object-responsibility for a certain object
or event," he explains, allows the subject to "own up to or disown that
object or event," to "claim or disclaim authorship of it, and in doing so,"
to "use the object or event as a reference point."256 By "assuming respon-
sibility for an object or event," he adds, the subject affirms itself as a "via-
ble source" of "authorship" and, thereby, also assumes "subject-responsi-
bility."257 Conversely, by disowning and disclaiming authorship of an
event such as lawbreaking violence through performative narratives of ra-
cial deviance, the subject denies subject-responsibility and, thus, performs
acts of self and community destruction.
The principle of collectivity holds lawyers and clients jointly responsi-
ble for the community destruction and harm caused by racialized narra-
tives. Imposition of ajoint responsibility hinges on engaging the client as
a codescriber and cointerpreter 6f legal texts. Guided by the teachings of
lawyer-client partnership,258 the principle locates community in collective
contexts of racial self-respect and self-love in plain rejection of the ideol-
ogy of colorblindness.259 Deploying broad antiracism and antipoverty
principles to evaluate the "interests" of the black community, David
251. Id. at 966 ("Such identification or detachment applies to the various dimensions
along which the self can be constituted, such as the mental, the physical, and the social.").
252. Winter, supra note 220, at 241-42.
253. Hutchinson, supra note 220, at 1185.
254. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 249, at 959 ("In the free will paradigm, responsibility
is grounded in the agent's capacity to choose her actions freely.").
255. Id. at 963.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Hing, supra note 198, at 1808 (observing that "[glood community oriented
lawyers... work in partnership with the client").
259. See David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal
Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1981,
2015-16 (1993) (assailing the "ideology of colorblindness"); see also Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments
Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 162, 163 (1994) (asserting that
"colorblindness permits us to avoid any discussion of the morality orjustice of assimilation,
nationalism, or cultural difference").
19951 1337
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Wilkins repudiates colorblindness for its mistaken "perspectiveless-
ness."260 In an extension of the work of KimberlM Crenshaw,261 Wilkins
argues that perspectivelessness occurs when "the social, political, and in-
stitutional factors that frame a given legal issue are either left unexplored
or treated as objective and unproblematic."262
To combat perspectivelessness, Wilkins asserts, black law students
"must be able to recognize when the seemingly 'neutral' actions of their
clients are likely to adversely affect the interests of the black community
and to determine what they can do as lawyers to ameliorate these harmful
consequences."263 Perspectivelessness, he warns, "is likely to suppress"
this kind of dialogue. 26 In the hope of liberating lawyer-client dialogue,
Wilkins contemplates an alternative obligation thesis265 that directs
"black corporate lawyers to recognize that they have moral obligations
running to the black community that must be balanced against other le-
gitimate professional duties and personal commitments when deciding
on particular actions and, more generally, when constructing a morally
acceptable life plan."266
Elaborating upon Wilkins's obligation thesis, the principle of collec-
tivity offers strong as well as weak versions of race-conscious responsibil-
ity. Both versions rely on the moral validity of race-conscious categories
applied to eradicate unjust community hardship. 267 Under the strong
version, criminal defense lawyers accept the obligation to forego narra-
tives of racial deviance in their legal storytelling. Under the weak version,
lawyers abide by a lesser obligation to inform clients of their reservations
concerning the use of racialized narratives and urge them to consider
through character and community deliberation the impact that such nar-
ratives may have on their communities.
260. Wilkins, supra note 259, at 2008-16.
261. KimberlM W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 Nat'l Black LJ. 1, 12 (1989) (claiming that "objectivity of legal analysis is
grounded in the apparent perspectivelessness of the dominant discourse").
262. Wilkins, supra note 259, at 2015.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Wilkins claims that "some of th [e] traditional features of lawyer professionalism,
such as the duty to engage in law reform, the duty to provide legal counsel to those who
cannot afford to pay for it, and the duty to counsel clients on both the legal and moral
consequences of their conduct, are supportive of the model of lawyering contemplated by
the obligation thesis." Id. at 2019.
266. Id. at 1984.
267. Wilkins contends that "a proper analysis of the moral validity of race conscious
categories must account for the current disparity in the relative economic, social, and
political power of blacks and whites." Id. at 2020. Consideration of this disparity, Wilkins
insists, legitimately charges black professionals with the moral duty "to pay particular
attention to the interests of the black community [a]s a necessary step towards eradicating




To be sure, both versions of the ethic of race-conscious responsibility
suffer the historical burdens of racial subordination: exclusion 2 68 and
communicative inequality.269 Overcoming these burdens requires "new
types of text" and "new structures of public discourse."270 Lawyer-client
race-conscious dialogue presents such a text. Participants in a dialogic
model of racial discourse aspire to a relation in which "both lawyer and
client are engaged commonly in moral struggle irrespective of their diver-
gent attitudes and goals."271 The relation, Reed Loder suggests, enables
both "to gain connection and understanding."272 The key to sustaining




The ethic of race-conscious responsibility in criminal defense advo-
cacy provokes numerous objections. The objections challenge not only
the principles of race-consciousness, contingency, and collectivity, but
also the discretionary obligations that these principles imply. The limited
scope of this Essay prevents a full-scale mapping and critique of these
objections. Nonetheless, certain points of objection bear mention and
response. For an initial response, I formulate a set of middle-level rules
implementing both strong and weak versions of the ethic of race-con-
scious responsibility.
268. See Reed E. Loder, Out from Uncertainty. A Model of the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 2 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary I.J. 89, 142-43 (1993) (maintaining that
"[e]xclusion limits the moral imagination needed to conceive of factual variations in a
situation that help to identify important presuppositions and expose them to question").
269. Both Sherene Razack and Thomas McCarthy point to "massive" cross-cultural
inequalities in the conditions of dominant/subordinate group communication. See
Thomas McCarthy, Doing the Right Thing in Cross-cultural Representation, 102 Ethics
635, 645, 648 (1992); Sherene Razack, What Is to Be Gained by Looking White People in
the Eye? Culture, Race, and Gender in Cases of Sexual Violence, 19 Signs 894, 918 (1994).
270. McCarthy, supra note 269, at 648. McCarthy explains:
[W]hen previously subordinated groups can speak in their own voices, there are
marked changes in the very construction of texts dealing with them.... [Niew
types of text can assist in the formation of new structures of public discourse.
There is an interplay here between institutional and textual dynamics, between
the empowerment of different voices and writing in different voices, between
politics and poetics.
Id.
271. Loder, supra note 268, at 92, 141 (suggesting dialogic model of the lawyer-client
relation is "shaped by the participants' struggles for moral knowledge").
272. Id. at 141.
273. On collective dialogue, see Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern
Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 291, 378 (1985) ("Dialogism involves a
commitment to universality- we are all to be recognized as participants in our collective
conversation, and we are to hold it out as a real possibility that generalizable interests will




Salient objections arise from both theorists and practitioners of crim-
inal law. Critical race theorists, for example, may complain that race-con-
sciousness encourages an essentialist construction of racial identity and
narrative in legal storytelling about black male lawbreakers. The
Williams-Watson case demonstrates that the danger of racial essentialism
is clear and present. Developing a critique from my own racially domi-
nant position risks the reassertion of essentialist claims. 2 74 To avert such
claims, I advance a contingent and, therefore, unstable notion of black
male lawbreaking identity marked by the crosscutting tensions of devi-
ance and defiance narratives. Admitting to these extant tensions in no
way diminishes their complexity, particularly when faced with the difficul-
ties of recognizing narrative resistance and harnessing its transformative
potential.
2 75
Liberal theorists may protest that the very notion of contingency
subverts client autonomy. These theorists glean autonomy from a narrow
range of individual activities set apart from the obligations of community
membership. In the lawyer-client relationship, individual autonomy boils
down to an often hollow exercise of informed consent that hinges on
severely limiting assumptions about the force of sociolegal constraints.
Weakening those counterfactual assumptions erodes the material basis of
autonomy. To reinvigorate the concept of subjective autonomy, I urge
the deliberative consideration of moral character and community in law-
yer-client criminal defense counseling.
Practitioners may object that the principle of collectivity guiding law-
yer-client character and community deliberation impinges negatively on
client-centered rights and loyalties, undermining the adversarial system.
But practitioners offer a crabbed notion of such rights and loyalties. The
partisan duty they profess contains meager elements of client social re-
sponsibility and lawyer civic counsel. Furthermore, that duty ties loyalty
to an individualist, rather than a communitarian, axis. Contextualizing
lawyer-client counseling in a community setting enriches the adversarial
system by reducing lawyer and client self-serving opportunism.
B. Middle-Level Rules
To implement the principles of race-consciousness, contingency,
and collectivity animating the ethic of race-conscious responsibility, I
274. Kathleen Daly confronts a similar obstacle in conceptualizing how race operates
in the criminal law and in the criminal justice system. See Kathleen Daly, Criminal Law
andJustice System Practices as Racist, White, and Racialized, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 431,
433, 435-38 (1994). Daly asks: "Can I make reliable or reasonable claims about race when
I am on the dominant side of the relationship?" Id. at 437.
275. On the hindrances to the academic study of black resistance and transformation,
see Dorothy E. Roberts, Deviance, Resistance, and Love, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 179, 186
(noting "complexity of distinguishing between resistance and accommodation, between
what merely reproduces the status quo and what subverts it").
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turn to middle-level rules of criminal defense practice. The move toward
middle-level rules follows an earlier turn in the work of David Wilkins.2 76
Citing the importance of context and contextual factors to the lawyering
process, Wilkins argues that "legal ethics must develop a set of 'middle-
level principles' that both isolate and respond to relevant differences in
social and institutional context while providing a structural foundation
for widespread compliance in the areas where they apply."277 He con-
trasts a middle-level approach with the universality of traditional ethical
rules and the discretion of "purely case-by-case" decisional rules, uncover-
ing shared "problems of definition and application."278 These problems,
he concedes, compromise middle-level principles "because every general-
ization will exclude some arguably relevant contextual factor while al-
lowing some room for interpretation at the point of application."279
Following Wilkins, middle-level rules of race-conscious criminal de-
fense ethics must entail both context-based distinctions and context-spe-
cific discretion. 280 Two contextual approaches may serve to meet these
requirements. The first, a strong version, urges criminal defense lawyers
to forego unilaterally the use of racially deviant narratives except when the
narratives suit a regime of "ad hoc nullification."281 Ad hoc nullification,
William Simon explains, involves a legal actor's substantive judgment "to
subvert the enforcement of presumptively authoritative legal-typically
statutory-norms." 28 2 According to Simon, lawyer conduct that subverts
substantive legal norms and practices of "excessive and discriminatory
punishment" may be "desirable."28 3 To the extent that the Williams-
Watson legal teams deployed racialized deviant narratives to subvert an
excessive and discriminatory prosecution, their conduct may be justified.
The second approach, a weak version, prescribes lawyer-client char-
acter and community deliberation of racial identity and injury. Both the
Model Rules and the Model Code contain some elements of this version.
276. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 468, 515-19
(1990) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism]; David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count:
Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1145, 1216-17 (1993)
[hereinafter Wilkins, Making Context Count].
277. Wilkins, Legal Realism, supra note 276, at 516 (footnote omitted). Wilkins takes
the notion of middle-level principles from Dennis F. Thompson, Political Ethics and Public
Office (1987). Thompson recommends middle-level principles to citizens engaged in
politics as a way "to make reasoned collective judgments without presuming the truth of
any single foundational theory." Id. at 8. Thompson asserts: "Even if the conflicts with
which political ethics deals can be resolved at some fundamental level of philosophy, we
still need some middle-level principles to guide our judgments at the level of political
action." Id.
278. Wilkins, Legal Realism, supra note 276, at 515, 519.
279. Id. at 516 (foomote omitted).
280. See Wilkins, Making Context Count, supra note 276, at 1216-17.
281. William H. Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense,
91 Mich. L. Rev. 1767, 1771 (1993).
282. Simon, supra note 151, at 1724.
283. Id. at 1724-25.
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Model Rule 2.1 provides that "[i]n rendering advice, a lawyer may refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, so-
cial and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."28 4
Ethical Consideration 7-8 of the Model Code similarly provides that the
"[a] dvice of lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal con-
siderations."28 5 Additionally, the Model Code states: "In assisting his cli-
ent to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point
out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well
as legally permissible."28 6 Although neither rule explicitly refers to delib-
erations of character and community or to matters of racial identity and
injury, each contains operative terms of sufficient normative breadth to
permit their inclusion. That inclusion will ensure a particularized factual
inquiry into the circumstances of a racial community, including its poten-
tial for injury, seems unlikely given dominant accounts of criminal de-
fense advocacy and ethics.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have tried to explore the criminal defense strategy of
invoking a "group contagion" theory of diminished capacity as a means of
studying the historical intersection of race, lawyers, and ethics in the
American criminal justice system, notably in a case of racially-motivated
private violence. The exploration problematizes the logic of categorical
abstractions 287 and public/private distinctions in criminal defense advo-
cacy in order to ally the concept of racial justice with a more intersubjec-
tive, communal sensibility. I hope that this account, though tentative, will
launch debate over the proposition that to deny, exploit, and ultimately
demean race in the name of advocacy wounds our clients, their commu-
nities, and ourselves. 28 8 Absent debate, the daily wounds of advocacy lie
without mend.
284. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1.
285. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-8.
286. Id.
287. Categorical abstractions of race inhibit empathy. See Thomas Ross, The
Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 1, 6 (1990) (maintaining that "black abstraction" blunts "empathetic response").
288. Fundamentally, the account seeks to explode the instrumental logic of criminal
defense advocacy and ethics, to rid us of the "belief that the tools of legal understanding
remain separated from us when we engage in legal understanding, that we are unaffected,
that we are free." J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject
and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale LJ. 105, 165 (1993).
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